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Important benefits and burdens are distributed in American society
on the basis of predictions about individual behavior. Release from
prison, places in schools, jobs, and retail credit are among the benefits
distributed to those applicants who are found most likely to succeed.
The effort to predict an applicant's behavior can be made in a variety
of ways: by professional experts or ordinary laymen, by use of individ-
ualized judgment or formulas that assign fixed weights to prede-
termined characteristics of the applicant. No matter what method is
used, it typically generates controversy.
This controversy is expressed in policy debates over the fairness or
wisdom of choosing a particular method for selecting applicants. It also
appears in litigation challenging a selection system on the ground that it
violates some constitutional or statutory requirement. When the deci-
sionmaker is a government agency, such as the parole authority or a
public school, then the choice of a selection system is plainly a matter
of public concern. As a political matter it involves the allocation of
public resources, and as a legal matter it is subject to the requirements
of fairness contained in the due process and equal protection clauses
of the United States Constitution. But even when the decisionmaker
is a private institution, such as a private employer or lender, its prac-
tices are often subject to public scrutiny and legal control. Many
private decisionmakers are prohibited by law from discrimination on
the basis of race, sex, and various other attributes. Enforcement of that
prohibition requires the decisionmaker to respond to claims of illegal
discrimination, by explaining his selection system, and thereby exposing
it to public scrutiny. That exposure in turn generates a demand for
new legal restraints on methods of selection.
In order to decide whether new legal restraints should be imposed,
or even simply to choose a fair and effective selection system, it is
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necessary to identify clearly the advantages and disadvantages of the
various available techniques for selection. The political and legal con-
troversy over the various prediction methods in current use reflects
considerable confusion over the differences among methods, and par-
ticular confusion over the nature of prediction methods based on
statistically validated formulas or scoring schemes.
This article examines the tangled objections and ambivalent reac-
tions to particular prediction methods, and to the process of prediction
itself. It identifies the unarticulated values built into prediction
schemes, and also the unarticulated values called into play by various
objections. The resulting analysis demonstrates that important uses
exist for predictive selection schemes, and that different circumstances
may compel the use of one type of predictive scheme rather than
another. The article presents criteria for choosing the system most
appropriate to a particular factual context. Part I considers questions
about the basic decision to predict: the decision to select applicants on
the basis of their predicted behavior instead of their past merit, or their
need, or their luck in a random draw. Part II considers questions about
the choice of a predictive method: whether to rely on individualized
judgment, or to combine objective data about applicants according to a
statistically validated formula. Part III considers the questions that
arise, if a statistically validated formula is used, concerning the choice
of the particular items to be used in constructing that formula.
I. The Decision to Predict
Two main themes dominate the controversy over predictive tech-
niques of selection: questions of accuracy and questions of legitimacy.
Critics contend that the techniques are not sufficiently accurate to
justify their use, and that in any event their use is not legitimate in
some particular context because it is inconsistent with respect for the
autonomous individual.
One example of this controversy arises over the use of prediction to
fix the period of imprisonment for a convicted criminal. The prevail-
ing system for sentencing criminals relies on prediction at two different
points. First, the sentencing judge typically fixes a period of imprison-
ment based partly on a judgment about the chance that the offender
will commit further crimes. This criterion is seldom made explicit in
the statutes, but it rests on the common understanding that one im-
portant function of imprisonment is incapacitation: the prevention of
those crimes that would have been committed during the period of
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imprisonment.1 An offender who is thought likely to commit further
crimes will for that reason be sentenced to a longer term than a similar
offender who is thought less likely to do so. The effort at prediction
enters the process again when the prisoner is considered for release to
the supervised status of parole. Typically one of the most important
prerequisites for parole is a finding that the prisoner is likely to avoid
further crimes while at liberty.2
Critics have challenged both the accuracy and the legitimacy of
prediction in the context of sentencing and parole. Most critics contend
that predictions of criminal behavior are not accurate enough to use as
a basis for a decision about a matter as important as liberty.3 Indeed,
existing techniques for parole prediction are highly inaccurate by any
measure.4 First, available methods are severely limited in their capacity
to distinguish persons who will succeed from those who will fail.5
1. Sentencing is also influenced by other commonly recognized functions of punish-
ment, such as deterrence, rehabilitation, and the expression of the moral condemnation
of the community. For a discussion of the functions of criminal punishment, see, e.g., H.
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 35-61 (1968); Hart, The Aims of the
Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 401 (1958). Judges in general have great discre-
tion in assigning weight to these various functions, and resolving conflicts among them.
For an influential discussion of the resulting chaoi, and a plea for reform, see M. FRANKEL,
CRIMINAL SENTENCES (1972).
2. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d) (1976) (prisoner may not be released if there is "reason-
able probability that he will commit any Federal, State, or local crime"); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 54-125 (1977) (release requires "reasonable probability that such inmate will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law"); 7 N.Y. CODES, RULES AND REGS., ch. XII,
§ 1910.5 (1974) (release requires "reasonable probability that the inmate will not violate
the law"); see R. DAwsON, SENTENCING 263-78 (1969) (American Bar Foundation study of
sentencing and parole practices in three midwestern states).
3. See N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 62-73 (1974); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING
JUSTICE 19-26 (1976) (Report of Committee for the Study of Incarceration); Monahan &
Monahan, Prediction Research and the Role of Psychologists in Correctional Institutions,
14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1028, 1029-30 (1977) (reporting controversy over accuracy of predic-
tion of criminal behavior).
4. One way to describe the accuracy of a predictive device is to use the percentage of
predictions that prove correct. That percentage will depend not only on the device, but
on the true distribution of successes and failures in the population under study. For
example, a device that always predicts success will be 100% accurate on a population
that contains only people who will succeed; the accuracy of the device will decline with the
proportion of true successes in the population.
Other measures of accuracy attempt to describe the discriminating power of the device
in a manner that is independent of the population. Such measures are constructed from
two component factors: the proportion of successes accurately identified by the device, and
the proportion of failures accurately identified by it. If the device is more accurate in
identifying successes than in identifying failures, then its total observed accuracy will
increase and decrease with the number of true successes in the population. For discussion
of various measures of accuracy, see F. SIMON, PREDICTION METHODS IN CRIMINOLOGY 16-29
(1971); Duncan, Ohlin, Reiss & Stanton, Formal Devices for Making Selection Decisions,
58 AM. J. Soc. 573 (1953); Ohlin & Duncan, The Efficiency of Prediction in Criminology,
54 AM. J. Soc. 441 (1949).
5. It is difficult to obtain the information necessary to characterize the accuracy of a
predictive technique designed for parole decisions, because a prediction of failure usually
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Second, under available methods, predictions of failure typically carry
a much higher error rate than predictions of success.6 Even when
predictions of failure are made very conservatively, the high-risk group
identifiable by present methods has a failure rate that may strike some
as too low to use as a ground for extending incarceration.
The limited accuracy of existing parole prediction devices supports
leads to incarceration, preventing anyone from discovering whether the prediction was
correct. Nevertheless, the information can sometimes be obtained or approximated, either
by deliberate experimentation or by observations of people released on the basis of
criteria different from those being tested. Even prisoners who are predicted to fail are
released at the expiration of sentence, and hence they can be observed, like parolees, to
see whether they commit new crimes.
In this way some data on the performance of various parole prediction techniques has
been collected. See, e.g., F. SIMON, supra note 4 (reviewing prior studies and reporting
new one); Hoffman, Mandatory Release: A Measure of Type Ir Error, 11 CRIM'IINOLOGY
541 (1974); Ohlin & Duncan, supra note 4. The studies suggest that available techniques
often do less well than a policy of predicting success for everyone. This is in part because
parole failure is a relatively rare event in many prisoner populations, and failure in the
form of serious violent crime is even more rare. Therefore, a policy of predicting success
for everyone would be fairly accurate, and can be bettered only by a quite powerful
prediction technique. See generally Meehl 9- Rosen, Antecedent Probability and the
Efficiency of Psychometric Signs, Patterns, or Cutting Scores, 52 PSYCH. BULL. 194 (1955),
reprinted in P. MEEHL, PSYCHODIAGNOSIS: SELECTED PAPERS 32 (1973) (examining methods
for evaluating validity of predictive psychometric devices) [hereinafter cited as PSYCHO-
DIAGNOSIS].
The task of comparing predictive techniques is complicated by the fact that not all
studies use the same definitions of success and failure. In the context of sentencing and
parole, failure may be defined as any violation of parole conditions, any crime committed
after release, or any violent crime committed after release. A failure may be counted if
it occurs within six months of release, within one year, or within some longer period. A
failure may be established by conviction, parole revocation, or independent evidence.
6. See, e.g., Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerous-
ness, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 371, 389-92 (1972) (61.3% error rate among predictions of
failure, 8.6% error rate among predictions of success); Wenk, Robinson & Smith, Can
Violence Be Predicted? 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 393, 394-96 (1972) (86% error rate among
predictions of failure, 5% error rate among predictions of success). The higher error rate
accompanying predictions of failure occurs partly because parole failure is less common
than parole success. If a prediction device is equally accurate in identifying successes and
failures, then its errors will be evenly distributed over the population. The erroneous
predictions will contain succeeders in proportion to their numbers in the population. It
follows, then, that in a population that contains mostly succeeders, erroneous predictions
will involve mostly succeeders, and hence will be mostly erroneous predictions of failure.
A better accuracy rate can sometimes be obtained for the predictions of failure in these
circumstances by changing the cut-off score on a selection device, tilting the decision
toward prediction of success, and thereby increasing erroneous predictions of success. But
even this possibility has not enabled anyone to predict parole failure with an accuracy
rate higher than about 80%. That is, even among those identified as most likely to fail
on parole, some 20% can be expected to succeed. See, e.g., Hoffman & Beck, Salient Factor
Score Validation-A 1972 Release Cohort, 4 J. Canm. JusT. 69, 71 (1976) (80% failure rate
among people with score of zero on federal parole board scoring scheme in 1972, 75%
failure rate among people with score of zero in 1970); Wolfgang, Crime in a Birth Cohort,
117 PRoC. Am. PHILOSOPHICAL Sody 404 (1973), reprinted in 3 CRIME AND JUSTICE 161 (L.
Radzinowicz & M. Wolfgang 2d rev. ed. 1977) (70-80% recidivism rate among people who
have three prior criminal offenses) [hereinafter cited as Wolfgang, with page references to
3 CRIME AND JUsTICE].
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a telling argument against the use of any one of them. But it hardly
counts against an effort to refine the methods of prediction, and to
reduce the number and distribution of errors to some tolerable level.
Nevertheless, several critics have explicitly rejected the effort to im-
prove the accuracy of parole prediction,7 and it seems likely that others,
who now confine their attacks to the limitations of existing techniques,
in fact object more fundamentally to the enterprise. In other fields, too,
the challenge to the use of prediction seems to rest partly on a concern
about accuracy and errors, and partly on some more fundamental
ground."
One reason to reject efforts to improve prediction may be grounded
in the view that the limitations in existing techniques are inherent in
the nature of prediction. The argument is that a prediction of future
behavior is necessarily less accurate than any other determination that
might be the basis for decision. Some may trace this inherent limitation
to a distinction between future fact and present or past fact: the claim
would be that for a question of past or present fact there is in principle
a true answer, and any errors in factfinding are attributable only to
inadequacies of evidence or of judgment. For a question of future fact,
however, it may be that no amount of evidence or judgment can make
the answer accessible. 9
7. Professor Andrew von Hirsch explicitly considers the possibility of developing a
predictive technique with an error rate that is no greater than the rate at which the
existing system of criminal trials convicts innocent persons. Von Hirsch, Prediction of
Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. REv.
717, 744-50 (1972). If such a technique were developed, he would oppose its use on the
ground that it violates "basic concepts of individual liberty," id. at 745, and that it
entails "unjustified risks of abuse," id. at 748. A similar point is made by Ronald Dworkin,
though less elaborately; he argues that it is unjust to imprison someone on the basis of
an actuarial prediction, however accurate, "because that denies his claim to equal respect
as an individual." R. DWORIUN, TAKING RIsGS SERIOUSLY 13 (1977).
8. See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 49-52 (1973) (criticizing efforts to predict successful parenting for child-custody
determinations).
9. For a discussion of various philosophical views about the difference between past
and future facts, see Sellars, Time and the World Order, in 3 MINNESOTA STUDIES IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 527 (H. Feigl & G. Maxwell eds. 1962). See generally B. DE JOUVENEL,
THE ART OF CONJECTURE (1976) (exploring nature of forecasting techniques).
Courts and legal commentators have noted in various contexts that prediction of future
events is an unusually difficult form of factfinding. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 402 n.4 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (prediction that children will not become
public charges unacceptable as prerequisite for issuing marriage license to parent; statute
authorizes standardless discretion and hence raises serious question of procedural due
process "in light of the hazards of prediction in this area"); State v. Turner, 556 S.W.2d
563, 566 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 929 (1978) (reasonable-doubt standard should
not apply to civil commitment proceedings because prediction of dangerous conduct cannot
be made with same certainty as determination of past fact); Black, Due Process for Death:
Jurek v. Texas and Companion Cases, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 4-8 (1976) (prediction of
future conduct less suitable than past fact as criterion for death penalty); Broun &
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As a practical matter, however, the distinction between future facts
and past or present facts is unsound. Some past or present facts are as
elusive as any prediction, and some predictions can be made with as
much confidence as most determinations of past fact °.0 If accuracy is
the chief concern, it should be possible to specify the level of error that
is tolerable in the decision to imprison an offender, and hold all fact-
finding to that standard, whether it involves matters of past or future
fact." Perhaps no available predictive method is sufficiently accurate
to satisfy the high standard of accuracy appropriate for the decision
to incarcerate, but it may still be possible to develop one.
Moreover, in contexts other than parole, the requisite standard of
accuracy may be more easily met. For example, the attempt to predict
school success or failure from test scores is notoriously limited in ac-
curacy. 2 Nevertheless, the decision to reject applicants from school
demands a lower standard of accuracy than the decision to deny pris-
Kelly, Playing the Percentages and the Law of Evidence, 1970 U. IL.. L.F. 23, 32-34
(probability estimates should be admissible for predictions, but not for questions of past
fact, for which better evidence is available); Note, Judicial Review of Facts in Informal
Rulemaking: A Proposed Standard, 84 YALE L.J. 1750, 1763-64 (1975) (judicial review of
agency determinations should be more deferential with respect to predictions than with
respect to findings of past fact).
10. For example, past states of mind are notoriously difficult to determine, and it is
relatively easy to determine the amount of interest that will be paid by a bank on a
deposit. A few courts and commentators have noticed that it is unsound to draw a dis-
tinction between the difficulties of predicting future events and the difficulties of dis-
covering the truth about past events. See, e.g., Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court,
407 U.S. 355, 364 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari); Fiss, The
Jurisprudence of Busing, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 194, 211-12 (1975); Tribe, Trial By
Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1329, 1344-46
(1971); Note, Evidential Use of Mathematically Determined Probability, 28 HARV. L.
Rsv. 693, 695-96 (1915).
11. This approach to the problem is difficult, however, if there are moral or other
objections to making explicit the level of error that is tolerable in the decision to in-
carcerate. Cf. Tribe, supra note 10, at 1372-75 (moral objection to inviting juries to
quantify probability of guilt and associated risk of error in criminal cases).
12. The Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) of the College Entrance Examination Board
is designed for use in college admissions to predict college performance. The Board
claims that SAT verbal scores give an applicant's "true score" with a "standard error of
measurement" of 32 points. This means, inter alia, that applicants with the same "true
score" are likely to show a difference in test scores of up to 64 points; applicants who
differ by that amount may indeed perform equally well. Similarly, the measurement error
for SAT mathematics scores is 35, yielding a probable range in test scores of up to 70
points. Furthermore, SAT scores do not predict college performance after the freshman
year as well as they predict freshman-year grades. Although the probability is that the
lower-scoring applicant will perform less well in college than his higher-scoring competitor
who is still within his "standard error of measurement" range, there is significant chance
that the true performance order will be reversed. Thus if some performance level is de-
fined as "success" and used as an admissions criterion, then some applicants whose
performance predicted by the SAT falls below that level will be erroneously excluded. See
Reinhold, What the Test Scores Do and Don't Say about a Child, N.Y. Times, May I,
1977, § 12, at 18, col. I.
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oners parole, and the limited accuracy of test predictions may satisfy
that standard.
The use of predictive criteria for selection is subject to challenge not
only on grounds of accuracy, however, but also on the ground that it
conflicts with other important social values, involving respect for in-
dividual autonomy. The attempt to predict an individual's behavior
seems to reduce him to a predictable object rather than treating him as
an autonomous person. It is this apparent conflict, between predicting
behavior and respecting autonomy, that leads some critics to argue
that a prediction of individual behavior, however small the risk of
error, is an inappropriate criterion for the selection of individuals for
imprisonment, and for various other benefits and burdens as well. To
imprison a person because of the crimes he is expected to commit denies
him the opportunity to choose to avoid those crimes. Similarly, to
reject a job applicant on the basis of a test score that predicts poor
performance denies him the opportunity to outperform the prediction.
The argument is that respect for individual autonomy requires recogni-
tion of the possibility that an individual can choose to refute any
prediction about himself.
In principle, of course, predictive decisionmaking makes explicit
allowance for the fact that some individuals would, if given the op-
portunity, prove a prediction wrong. Predictive judgments are gen-
erally tentative rather than certain, 13 because available evidence and
present knowledge are limited, and perhaps also because individuals
act autonomously notwithstanding predictions about them. But while
predictive decisionmaking recognizes in principle the possibility of
autonomous choice, and the possibility of refuting predictions, the use
of a predictive system leaves little opportunity for the operation of that
autonomy, and tends to minimize its importance for both applicants
and decisionmakers.
For the applicant, the effect is to shift his attention from the pre-
dicted future behavior to the method used for making predictions. An
applicant can improve his chances for selection, if at all, only by im-
proving the prediction made about him, and not by attempting directly
to improve his future performance. For example, an applicant for
13. That is, the predictive judgment claims only that the person is likely to succeed
or to fail, not that he will. Thus the proponents of the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in civil commitment proceedings maintain that it is quite feasible to
determine beyond a reasonable doubt that a person is mentally ill and likely to injure
himself or others; that proposition can be true even if the person in fact would not
injure anyone. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1, 164 (1970)
("it would not be anomalous for a fact-finder to believe without any doubt that a person
was 'dangerous' while still in doubt whether he would commit any specific harm if
released") (footnote omitted).
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credit may improve his chances by building a history of credit transac-
tions.14 An applicant for admission to college may improve his chances
by participating actively in student organizations. 15 The applicant's
efforts are thus directed toward improving his appearance as a good
risk, without regard to any effect on actual future performance. More-
over, some predictive systems deny the applicant even this channel for
the exercise of autonomous choice, for some systems render him power-
less to affect the prediction about him. For example, if parole risk is
assessed largely on the basis of race, gender, or age,' 6 then the applicant
for parole has no power by his own acts to improve his score. Similarly,
if successful performance as a parent is predicted largely on the basis
of one's experiences as a child,17 then the applicant for child custody
has no power by his own acts to improve the prediction about him.
Some methods and criteria for making predictions give the applicant
more opportunity than others to affect the prediction.' 8 But predictive
systems typically tend to encourage him to focus his attention on im-
proving his predictive score, whether or not that also improves his
future performance. A direct attempt to improve performance, if it
does not also improve the predictive score, will have no effect on his
chance of selection.' 9
When the predicted fact is not subject to individual control, then
predicting that fact is less threatening to the value of respect for
autonomy.20 For example, prediction of violent behavior by the men-
14. See, e.g., R. COLE, CONSUMER AND COMMERCIAL CREDIT MANAGEMENT 245-322 (5th
ed. 1976); A. SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING 69-75 (1974); Hassler, Meyers & Seldin, Payment
History as a Predictor of Credit Risk, 47 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 383 (1963).
15. Interview with Worth David, Dean of Undergraduate Admissions at Yale Uni-
versity, in New Haven, Conn. (Oct. 13, 1978).
16. Some studies suggest that race may be a reliable predictor of delinquency. See,
e.g., Wolfgang, supra note 6, at 161. Wolfgang's study also suggests that age may be used
as a predictor of crime. Id. at 172 (probability of arrest increases with age to 17, and then
decreases with age); see E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 87 (1975) (violent crime is
highest among young males).
17. Studies of child abuse suggest that the victims of child abuse in turn abuse their
own children. See Spinetta & Rigler, The Child-Abusing Parent: A Psychological Review,
77 PSYCHOLOCICAL BULL. 296, 298 (1972) (reviewing literature).
18. This matter will be discussed in Parts II and III, infra.
19. Ideally, improving one's predictive score would also improve performance. But
that will happen only if the factors that produce the score actually have some causal
effect on performance. This causal relationship is not always present. See pp. 1441-42 infra
(discussion of declining accuracy of prediction schemes relying on factors that applicants
can control).
Moreover, when the focus of attention is on improving a predictive score, as it may be
when the connection between score and performance is not obvious, then action taken to
improve the score will not feel to the actors like action taken to improve performance.
20. Note that the fact predicted is different from the facts used to make the predic-
tion. Predicting an individual's race, or gender, or age does not seem to threaten the
individual's autonomous choicemaking. Using those factors to predict something else,
however, would present a substantial threat to autonomy. See pp. 1434-36 infra.
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tally ill, while widely challenged on the ground of inaccuracy, is seldom
characterized as a threat to the autonomy of the mentally ill.21
Similarly, there seems to be little challenge to the legitimacy of pre-
dicting behavior that is controlled by the individual only in a rather
remote and indirect way. For example, the effort to predict death or
illness for purposes of insurance does not seem to threaten the value
of autonomy. To the extent that individuals control their future death
or illness, that control is exercised indirectly, by a series of acts taken
prior to the event. Those acts may well be proper subjects for induce-
ments and penalties, which can be built into particular predictive sys-
tems, 22 but the possibility of influencing those choices does not convert
the event of dying, or falling ill, into an autonomous act.2 3 The con-
flict between prediction and respect for autonomy is most acute when
the predicted behavior is strongly and directly subject to individual
control. For example, the act of obeying or violating the criminal law
is subject to individual control, and indeed that fact is central to the
structure of the criminal law.24 The strong tradition of respect for in-
21. But see Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health
Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 630-35 (1978) (commitment of mentally ill is objectionable
not only because predictions of harmful behavior are inaccurate, but also because they
incorrectly imply that harmful behavior of mentally ill is less freely chosen and con-
trollable than that of anyone else). See also id. at 532-33 & n.11 (surveying commentary
on mental health laws in general, and noting growing body of criticism urging that law
should respect dignity of mentally ill persons by holding them responsible for choosing
their behavior).
22. See pp. 1437-42 & note 83 infra.
23. But see Crawford, Sickness as Sin, HEALTH/PAC BULL., Jan./Feb. 1978, at 10
(analyzing and responding to emerging view that individuals should be regarded as
responsible for their susceptibility to illness or accident).
24. Professor H.L.A. Hart has lucidly described and defended the view that criminal
punishment is properly reserved for those who choose to commit offenses, and are for
that reason blameworthy. See the collection of essays published as PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY (1968), especially Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in id. at
1, and Changing Conceptions of Responsibility, in id. at 186. For other influential state-
ments of this view, which dominates Anglo-American criminal law and scholarship, see
H. PACKER, supra note 1, at 73-79; Hart, supra note 1; Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme
Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 107.
While paying tribute to this ideal, Anglo-American criminal law has not always
respected it. See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (corporation president
criminally liable for storage of food in rat-infested warehouse, despite his lack of personal
knowledge or intent). Moreover, some critics have urged the abandonment of the ideal
of the voluntary and blameworthy offender. See, e.g., B. WoorTON, CRIME AND THE
CRIMINAL LAw 52-57, 117-18 (1963). But the ideal seems unlikely to be abandoned, even
if inconsistencies are tolerated. The ideal of the voluntary and blameworthy offender is
essential to the retributive ideology that informs many recent proposals to reform the
sentencing process. See, e.g., N. MORRIS, supra note 3; P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D.
CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM (1977); REPORT OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING: FAIR AND CERTAIN
PUNISHMENT (1976); E. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 16; A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 3; J.
WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975). For an attempt to explain the renascence of retri-
bution, see Coffee, Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accountability, Predictability, and
Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEo. L.J. 975, 1073-80 (1978).
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dividual autonomy in criminal law theory may account for a large
measure of the resistance to efforts to predict crime for purposes of
sentencing and parole.
The conflict between predictive selection and respect for autonomy
affects not only applicants but also decisionmakers. Just as applicants
are discouraged by predictive selection from acting to improve their
future performance, so is the decisionmaker discouraged from acting to
improve the chances of the people identified as bad risks. A decision-
maker who selects and excludes individuals on the basis of their pre-
dicted behavior tends to view the prediction as a fixed attribute of the
applicant, and tends not to consider ways of intervening to change the
situation. If sentencing authorities have the power to extend the im-
prisonment of people identified as bad parole risks, then they may be
less likely to seek ways of improving the prospects of those people
through new forms of treatment during imprisonment or supportive
services after release. If school officials have the power to exclude
people identified as bad educational risks, then they may be less likely
to seek ways of assisting those people to improve their prospects. If state
officials can remove a child from the home of a parent who is expected
to abuse that child, then they may be less likely to seek ways of in-
tervening to reduce that risk.
There is no necessary connection between the use of predictive selec-
tion and the absence of effort to improve the prospects of the people
identified as poor risks. In principle, a predictive selection system
could be used to identify poor risks and provide special benefits to
them rather than excluding them from benefits. Nevertheless, the
practice of denying benefits to the bad risks is so widespread that it
supports an objection to predictive selection that cannot be ignored.
In addition to the effect of predictive selection on applicants and
decisionmakers, the general public may be affected in an important
way by the symbolic qualities of the decision to predict individual
behavior. The use of a predictive selection system makes the statement
that prisoners or job applicants seldom act to refute the predictions
about them, and it may cause others to act as if the prediction were
true. The choice that would refute the prediction becomes simply a
source of error in the predictive system, rather than an event to be
encouraged or discouraged.
In spite of the persuasiveness of these criticisms of selection by
prediction, the tension between predictive selection and respect for
individual autonomy cannot be resolved in the abstract. It must be
considered in light of the nature of the behavior that is being predicted,
and the nature of the benefits or burdens to be distributed. Moreover
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the assessment of predictive selection must take into account the nature
of the plausible alternatives to predictive selection.
Criteria that purport to punish fault and reward merit frequently
provide the chief alternative to predictive criteria for selection. In
admitting students to school, the chief alternative to predicting future
performance is rewarding past effort and industry. In selecting crim-
inals for release from prison, the chief alternative to predicting future
crime is punishing past crime in proportion to its seriousness.
But these alternatives have their own limitations with respect to
both accuracy and legitimacy. Relative merit in the school context is
difficult to define, and even more difficult to measure. If effort and
industry constitute merit, then perhaps school behavior that merits
reward is identified more effectively by grades and recommendations
than by aptitude tests, but all available measures still fall far short of
precise identification. Moreover, it is no more obvious that places in
school should be distributed as rewards for the industrious than that
they should be distributed to those with the best prospects for success.2 5
Similarly, relative blame in the criminal context is difficult to define
and to measure. The seriousness of the crime is sometimes said to be
the correct measure of blame, but there are major controversies over
the proper determinants of seriousness: the actor's purposes for his
crime, the magnitude of the harm intended, or the magnitude of the
harm done.26 Moreover, why should release from prison be given as a
reward for low culpability rather than as an opportunity for those with
the best chances of success? The person with relatively low culpability
and a relatively high risk of failure poses a severe challenge for the
opponents of prediction, a challenge which they generally resolve by
incorporating some predictive criteria into their judgments of cul-
pability. A prior criminal record is of dubious relevance to the serious-
ness of the present crime, but it is of substantial value as a predictor of
future crime. By declaring that a prior record enhances culpability, the
25. It is tempting to deny the conflict between criteria for selection by supposing that
they converge to select the same people. But in fact the people with the best prospects for
success are not necessarily identical with the people who deserve reward for being in-
dustrious.
26. See, e.g., T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY (1964)
(when offenses ranked according to gravity by judges, students, and policemen, gravity
appears to depend on harm done, harm threatened, intent, and other factors); A. VON
HIRSCH, supra note 3, at 79-83 (gravity depends jointly on nature and likelihood of harm
risked, and on blameworthiness of offender); Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A
Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L.
Rav. 1497 (1974) (gravity of offense should not be measured by harm done); Zimring, The
Medium is the Message: Firearm Caliber as a Determinant of Death from Assault, I J.
LEGAL STUD. 97, 114-18 (1972) (gravity in cases of assault and homicide by firearms should
be measured by size of weapon, as indicator of harm risked).
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critics of prediction retain the benefits of prediction while denying its
legitimacy.2
-
The decisionmaker can avoid both predictions and evaluations of
merit by declining to make comparative judgments at all. One way to
avoid comparative judgments is to treat all applicants alike, accepting
or rejecting all of them. Some employers and schools do not attempt to
predict good performance, but instead accept all applicants who meet
some minimum standard of qualification, and later exclude those who
fail to demonstrate good performance.28 Some insurers avoid selecting
applicants by risk classification, and instead insure all applicants and
spread the cost of varying risks over the whole insured population.29
When it is not feasible to accept or reject all applicants, the decision-
maker can avoid making comparative judgments by instead making
random selections." Random selection has been proposed as a method
of admitting students to school,31 selecting individuals for compulsory
military service,32 and selecting a parent to be the custodian of a child
27. The point is made by Professor Joseph Goldstein, criticizing the treatment of
prior crimes in the Report of the Committee for the Study of Incarceration. See Appendix:
Additional Views of Individual Committee Members, in A. VON HIRsCH, supra note 3, at
173-74. Von Hirsch apparently changed his view of the matter. As principal author of
the Report of the Committee for the Study of Incarceration, he asserted that an offense
that follows a conviction may be regarded as more culpable, because it demonstrates
persistence, id. at 84-88, while in an earlier article he observed that counting prior con-
victions in current punishment is preventive confinement, not punishment. Von Hirsch,
supra note 7, at 749.
28. One example is the open admissions program of the City University of New
York (CUNT), which offers university admission to every high school graduate in New
York City. See The Open Admissions Story: 1970 at the City University of New York
(1970) (packet of internal documents, press releases, and news clippings on the program,
available from CUNY, Office of University Relations) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
Acceptance of all applicants may be a deliberate choice to avoid prediction, as at
CUNY, or it may be an interim measure, designed to aid in the development of a predic-
tion device. See, e.g., Gael, Grant & Ritchie, Employment Test Validation for Minority
and NonMinority Telephone Operators, 60 J. APPLiD PsYcHt. 411 (1975) (in order to
study new employment test, participating companies hired without regard to test scores).
29. One example is Social Security, which tailors neither the individual's costs nor his
benefits to an assessment of risk. Another example is group insurance provided to all
employees of a particular employer, or all members of a fraternal organization.
30. See Greely, The Equality of Allocation by Lot, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 113, 123-
26 (1977); cf. Divine, Women in the Academy: Sex Discrimination in University Faculty
Hiring and Promotion, 5 J.L. & EDUC. 429, 443-44 (1977) (proposes random selection from
pool of competent candidates for university professorships in order to suppress sex
discrimination).
31. Professor Duncan Kennedy has talked with the Harvard Law School admissions
office about using random selection to select entering students, but the proposal has
never reached a formal stage. Telephone Interview with Professor Duncan Kennedy (Oct.
13, 1978).
32. Random Selection for Military Service, Proc. No. 3945, 34 Fed. Reg. 19,017 (1969),
reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 455 app. (1970).
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after divorce.3 3 But the advantage of random selection is at the same
time its chief flaw: its obvious function as a technique to avoid making
comparative judgments. The decisionmaker who resorts to random
selection is vulnerable to the charge that he has abdicated responsibility
for decision in an important matter.
Alternatives to predictive selection, then, often have no stronger
claim to legitimacy than predictive selection. Thus, despite substantial
questions about the legitimacy and accuracy of predicting individual
behavior, predictive selection will sometimes be preferable to any other
available means of selection. For this reason, the various methods *of
making predictions must be considered more carefully.
II. The Choice Between Statistical and Clinical Methods
Techniques for predicting individual behavior generally use one of
two competing approaches to the problem. One approach relies on the
subjective judgment of experienced decisionmakers, who evaluate each
applicant on an individual basis in light of the experience accumulated
by the decisionmaker and his profession. Psychiatrists use this method
to predict violent behavior for purposes of involuntary hospitalization,
and in that context it is often called the exercise of clinical judgment,
or clinical prediction. The term clinical prediction can be generalized
to refer to the subjective evaluations performed in other fields as well.
For example, sentencing judges and some parole boards evaluate in-
dividuals in a subjective manner in order to predict future crime, and
similar methods are sometimes used by admissions officers to predict
academic success, by personnel officers to predict job success, and by
loan officers to predict loan repayment. In all these fields, clinical
prediction occurs when a decisionmaker attempts to assess applicants
as individuals, taking into account the characteristics that distinguish
each applicant.
The alternative method for making predictions evaluates each
applicant according to a predetermined rule for counting and weight-
ing key characteristics. The relevant characteristics are specified in
advance, and so is the rule for combining them to produce a score for
each applicant. This score must be convertible into an estimate of the
applicant's expected performance.34 This method of making predictions
33. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 8, at 63, 153 (judicial drawing of
lots may be best process for resolving hard choice in child custody proceeding).
34. Performance is sometimes treated as a dichotomous variable: each individual either
succeeds or fails. In that case, it is common to use a scoring device to divide the popula.
tion into groups, and to estimate the proportion of individuals who succeed at each score.
If, at a certain score, 80% of the individuals succeed, then the score is interpreted as
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is often called statistical prediction, because statistical techniques are
generally used to generate the rule from an analysis of prior cases,3 5 to
measure the accuracy of the rule in describing those prior cases 30 and
to decide whether the rule should be used to predict results in future
cases.3
7
Statistical scoring schemes have been used to predict parole success
from such items as number of prior convictions, type of crime, em-
identifying persons each of whom has an 80% chance of success. Selection is then made
by setting a minimum acceptable chance of success.
Alternatively, performance can be treated as a variable that is many-valued or even
continuous: each individual's performance can be assigned to a place on an ordered
scale. In that case, the scoring device can be used to estimate a performance level, and
selection is made by setting the minimum acceptable performance level.
35. Various methods exist for identifying the predictive factors that seem most strongly
associated with performance, and assigning weights to them. Among the most widely used
are multiple regression analysis, analysis of variance, and factor analysis. See generally
H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS (2d ed. 1972) (describing range of elementary statistical
techniques, their underlying mathematical assumptions, and the problems of statistical in-
ference associated with each technique); F. SIMON, supra note 4, at 72-117 (statistical
techniques described and applied to sample of probationers in United Kingdom). These
various methods do not necessarily identify the same factors or assign the same weights to
them; indeed, even a single technique, multiple regression analysis, can produce different
results depending on which factors are investigated first and on other matters of judg-
ment. See F. MOSTELLER 9' J. TuKEY, DATA ANALYSIS AND REGRESSION 258-332, 381-406
(1977).
36. The rule for combining predictors produces an estimate of performance. For the
prior cases, both that estimate and actual performance are known. It is therefore possible
to examine the accuracy of the rule in predicting performance. See note 4 supra. More
generally, the accuracy of the device can be described by a measure of the association
between estimated and actual performance. Measures of association include correlation
coefficients and other indices. The choice among these measures depends on the number,
form, and distribution of the variables whose association is being tested. See generally H.
BLALOCK, supra note 35, at 219-502. For a given set of predictive factors, predictive accuracy
is maximized by using the weights assigned by multiple regression; that technique cannot
however guarantee the choice of those factors that would combine to produce the rule
with the greatest possible accuracy.
37. The observed association between actual performance and the estimates produced
by the rule might be attributed to chance, in which case the rule is useless as a guide to
future decisionmaking. If the relationship is not attributed to chance, then the assump-
tion is often made that it can be attributed to some cause that will persist, and that it is
therefore a useful guide to predicting the future. The technique of determining whether
an observed association should be attributed to chance is often called significance testing.
The relationship is accepted as likely to persist only if there is a sufficiently small
probability that the observed pattern of association could have occurred by chance. See
generally H. BLALOCK, supra note 35, at 109-216; F. MOSTELLER, R. ROURKE, & G. THOMAS,
PROBABILITY WITH STATISTICAL APPLICATIONS 494 (2d ed. 1970).
The assumption that the observed relationship is attributable to some persistent cause
rather than to chance does not require the identification of any particular causal rela-
tionship between the variables being examined. To identify a particular causal relation-
ship would require substantially more statistical and theoretical analysis than does the
assumption, for predictive purposes, that the forces producing a correlation will continue
to operate in a similar way, regardless of what those forces are. See H. BLALOCK, CAUSAL
INFERENCES IN NONEXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH 38-44 (1961). For a discussion of the role of
causal theory in prediction, see pp. 1444-47 infra.
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ployment history, and family ties. 38 They have been used to predict
the repayment of loans from such items as age, marital status, location
of residence, income, and assets.39 Educational testing is a more elab-
orate version of the same technique. Instead of a small number of
predictive items, a test used to select applicants for a school typically
rests on a large number of items-the answers to the questions that
constitute the test. These answers are scored and weighted according
to a predetermined rule, and applicants are then ranked on the basis
of their scores.4 0
The choice between clinical and statistical methods of prediction has
generated substantial controversy in each field where the choice has
been made. Although some of the controversy relates to the details of
particular clinical or statistical methods, a number of important and
recurring issues are raised by the choice between these two general
approaches to the problem of prediction. In general, proponents of
38. One such scheme has been adopted by the United States Parole Commission as
an aid in predicting parole performance. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1978). Called a Salient Factor
Score, it uses seven predictive factors: prior convictions, prior incarcerations, age at first
commitment, offense involvement of auto theft or checks, prior parole revocations, drug
history, and employment history. Under each of these categories the individual receives
points. For example, if the individual has no prior convictions, he receives three points;
if one prior conviction, he receives two points; if two or three, one point; if four or more,
no points. The higher the total score, the better the parole prognosis. The Salient Factor
Score is one important determinant of the date of parole release; the other important
determinant is the seriousness of the offense.
For a more detailed discussion of the Salient Factor Score by its originators, see Hoff-
man & Beck, Parole Decision-Making: A Salient Factor Score (Apr. 1974) (United States
Board of Parole Research Unit Report Two), adapted for publication, 2 J. CRIM. JUST.
195 (1974). For the history of its development, including various modifications made since
its first experimental use in 1972, see Coffee, supra note 24, at 991-93, 1017-32; Project,
Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 820-41, 861-
78 (1975).
39. See, e.g., Boggess, Screen-test your credit risks, 45 HARv. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1967,
at 113; Wells, New Customer Credit Pointing System, in NUMERICAL POINTING PLANS FOR
EVALUATING CONSUMER CREDIT RISKS 4-21 (1963) (report of Second Consumer Credit
Symposium, University of Pennsylvania); Note, Credit Screening and the ECOA: Applying
the Effects Test, 88 YALE L.J. 1450, 1453-58 (1979).
40. Tests produced by the Educational Testing Service are widely used to select
students for admission to college, graduate, and professional schools. These tests are
designed to predict an applicant's performance as defined by first-term or first-year
average grades. See Schrader, The Predictive Validity of College Board Admission Tests,
in COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION BOARD, THE COLLEGE BOARD ADMISSIONS TESTING
PROGRAM 117 (TV. Angoff ed. 1971) [volume hereinafter cited as ADMISSIONS TESTING].
When new items are proposed for addition to these examinations, the items are tested to
determine how well their results correlate with results for old questions (inter-test
reliability), and also how well their results correlate with performance as defined by
grades (predictive validity). Donlon & Angoff, The Scholastic Aptitude Test, in ADMISSIONS
TESTING, supra, at 27-29; Fremer & Chandler, Special Studies, in id. at 156-65; McPeek,
Pitcher & Carlson, The Predictive Effectiveness of Several Experimental Item Types and
the Operational Item Types in the Law School Admission Test in 1970-71, in 2 LAw




statistical method claim advantages of aggregate accuracy and efficiency,
while proponents of clinical method claim advantages of accuracy and
fairness in individual cases. These competing claims require closer
examination, but first it is necessary to consider the possibility that the
conflict is illusory.
It has sometimes been argued that the dichotomy between methods
of prediction is false, because clinical methods are simply inchoate and
inarticulate forms of statistical decisionmaking. The argument is that
a clinical decisionmaker can only respond to a finite number of char-
acteristics, and he inevitably weights them in accordance with the im-
portance they have shown in other cases, either in his own experience
or in a larger body of received experience. Statistical analysis, on this
view, makes explicit and articulates the process that would occur in any
event, if less carefully and candidly.
The argument, however, misses a critical distinction. A clinical
decisionmaker is not committed in advance of decision to the factors
that will be considered and the rule for combining them. He is free
to respond to individual differences whose relevance was not an-
ticipated by any rule. This power to respond to individual differences
may render clinical judgments either better or worse than statistical
decisions, with respect to either accuracy or legitimacy. Thus the dis-
tinction between the methods cannot be dismissed as unimportant.
41
A number of studies have attempted to test the relative accuracy of
clinical and statistical methods. Paul Meehl, in an important book on
the subject, examined this literature up to 1954 and found that, in the
reported studies, statistical methods always performed as well as or
better than clinical methods; 42 in papers since then, he has presented
additional evidence for the superior accuracy of statistical methods.
43
Of course the comparison of particular clinical and statistical methods
does not necessarily provide a trustworthy test of either general
41. The distinction arises not only in the context of prediction, but also in any other
factfinding process. It describes two different ways of approaching the task of moving
from evidence to facts, and that task presents similar problems whether the facts to be
found are past or future.
42. P. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION 90-119 (1954) (in 20 studies com-
paring clinical with statistical methods of making predictions in education, corrections,
psychiatry, and organic medicine, about half show statistical method superior, and about
half show no difference between methods).
43. P. MEEHL, When Shall We Use Our Heads Instead of the Formula? in PsycHODIAc-
NOSIS, supra note 5, at 88 (1957 review giving new total of 27 studies, with 17 showing
statistical methods superior and 10 showing no difference); P. MEEHL, What Can the
Clinician Do Ivell? in id. at 171-72 (1967 review giving new total of 35 studies, with 23
showing statistical methods superior and 12 showing no difference).
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methodology. There is no reason to suppose that either methodology
is represented in these studies by typical examples.44
Meehl suggests that clinical methods might be more accurate than
statistical methods if the available data are too diverse, and the un-
derstanding of the phenomenon too weak, to support the formulation
of a useful rule for combining factors to make predictions. 41 That is,
if the designers of the statistical rule have been unable to identify and
assign weights to all the important predictive items, then perhaps their
rule will be less accurate than the clinical judgment of an experienced
observer who relies on perceptions that he cannot articulate as explicit
rules. Meehl has conceded the apparent superiority of clinical methods
in one such reported comparison,46 and there may be others. But in
general, the limited available evidence suggests that statistical methods
tend to make fewer errors than do clinical methods that allow the
decisionmaker to consider unanticipated factors in the individual case.
47
Moreover, any such difference in accuracy is likely to be enhanced
by the effects of the comparative operating costs of the two types of
systems. A clinical system requires the careful exercise of skilled judg-
44. As Meehl observes, he uses statistical methods of analysis to assess the performance
of the two methodologies, in the sense that he generalizes from the cases studied to the
general methodologies they purport to represent. P. MEEHL, supra note 42, at 83-128, 136-
38. But doubts about statistical method are based on doubts about the ability of in-
dividuals to represent or be represented by a class. A skeptic about the advisability of
using statistical methods for selecting applicants questions the ability to select individual
applicants based on inferences from their membership in a class. Such a skeptic would
hardly be convinced by Meehl's demonstration, because he would also doubt the ability
to choose a selection technique based on inferences from its membership in a class of
techniques.
45. P. MEEHL, What Can the Clinician Do Well?. supra note 43, at 169-70. Meehl
identifies six factors which favor clinical prediction: 1) open-endedness, or ambiguity
about what is to be predicted; 2) unanalyzed stimulus-equivalences, or inability to
articulate the rules that guide subjective judgment; 3) empty cells, or the failure of
relevant factors to appear in the cases from which the statistical rule is derived; 4) theory
mediation, or the availability of general theory to generate predictions without statistical
support; 5) insufficient time for devising or applying a suitable statistical rule; 6) highly
configurated functions, or relationships that cannot be expressed in general mathematical
form. Id.
46. Meehl, Seer Over Sign: The First Good Example, I J. EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH
PERSONALITY 27 (1965) (discussing, with approval, Lindzey, Seer versus Sign, I J. Ex-
PERIMENTAL RESEARCH PERSONALITY 17 (1965)). Lindzey found that clinical predictions of
homosexual behavior among prisoners were significantly more accurate than statistical
predictions. Lindzey, supra, at 18. But see Goldberg, Seer over Sign: The First "Good"
Example? 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH PERSONALITY 168 (1968) (arguing that Lindzey's
study does not show superiority of clinical methods).
47. See Dawes, A Case Study of Graduate Admissions: Application of Three Principles
of Human Decision Making, 26 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 180 (1971), reprinted in STATISTICS AND
PUBLIC POLICY 295 (IV. Fairley & F. Mosteller eds. 1977) (statistical method superior to
clinical method in predicting academic performance; reviewing literature on method-
ological controversy); Mosteller, Assessing Unknown Numbers, in STATISTICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY, supra, at 168-70 (relative strengths of statistical method).
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ment for the evaluation of each individual applicant, and therefore the
marginal cost of evaluating additional applicants tends to be high. A
statistical system, on the other hand, requires less skill and less time
from its decisionmakers; the major costs of a statistical system arise at
the level of collecting and analyzing data and designing the system,
rather than administering it.
As the number of applicants increases, the costs of a clinical predic-
tion device increase much more rapidly than those of a statistical device.
Thus, even if a clinical device and a statistical device originally were
designed to attain roughly the same level of accuracy, failure to meet
rising costs would in practice undermine the accuracy of the clinical
device much more seriously than it would undermine the accuracy of
the statistical device.
Often, the two methods are equivalent in accuracy, or nearly so. In
that case, the choice between them is properly dominated by other
considerations, which may be characterized as issues of legitimacy.
One set of legitimacy issues concerns the extent to which each
method pays attention to the uniqueness of individuals. There is a
pervasive sense that in some circumstances justice requires individual-
ized decisionmaking, and that statistical methods fail to satisfy that
requirement. Thus, for example, sentencing and parole decisions made
according to predetermined rules have been criticized as inappro-
priately "fixed and mechanical,"48 and insufficiently sensitive to in-
dividual differences. Indeed, for capital sentencing, at least, this crit-
48. E.g., United States v. Schwarz, 500 F.2d 1350, 1352 (2d Cir. 1974) (invalidating
"fixed and mechanical approach" that denied Youth Corrections sentence to privileged
defendant); Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 144 (8th Cir. 1973) (invalidating
"mechanical" imposition of maximum sentence on selective-service violators). Several
courts have suggested that strict adherence to the federal Parole Commission guidelines
would violate a constitutional or statutory requirement of individualized determinations.
See, e.g., Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238, 259-63 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3586 (1979) (No. 78-572); United States v. Cruz, 544 F.2d 1162,
1164 n.6 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Norcome, 375 F. Supp. 270, 274 n.3 (D.D.C.), aff'd,
497 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1974). These courts have rejected only strict adherence to the
guidelines, and not all reference to them; one court concluded that guidelines can be
used "as a tool but not as a rule," Page v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (S.D. Fla.
1977). But other courts have held that there is no inconsistency between individualized
sentencing and strict adherence to the parole guidelines, because each defendant is in-
dividually evaluated to get his guideline score. See, e.g., Daniels v. United States Parole
Comm'n, 429 F. Supp. 518 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Barr v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 990 (W.D.
Okla. 1976).
In fact the parole guidelines include a provision for decisions that depart from the
guideline terms, so long as reasons are given for the departure. Whether or not such
departures often occur, the possibility of discretionary departure may be sufficient to meet
objections to a rigid rule. In practice, statistical rules are seldom adopted without
provision for clinical decisions that depart from the rules. Although there is no reason to
think that this technique improves aggregate predictive accuracy, it seems to make a
statistical device more acceptable to decisionmakers and their constituencies.
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icism has the status of a constitutional principle: the Supreme Court
has held that the Constitution prohibits capital sentencing according
to fixed rules, and requires individual discretionary judgments.
4 9
Another example can be found in school admissions. Many institutions
refuse to follow strictly the predictions made from test scores and
grades, on the ground that rigid reliance on numbers would be in-
sufficiently sensitive to individual differences.50
49. Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2965 (1978) (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.,
joined by Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (statute unconstitutional because it fails to
allow consideration of defendant's character and record and circumstances of offense,
thus violating principle that "an individualized decision is essential in capital cases");
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333-34 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,
JJ., announcing judgment of Court) (same); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
303-05 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., announcing judgment of Court)
(same). This requirement of individualized consideration, although consistently articulated
by only three (or four) justices, represents controlling law, because any capital statute
violating the requirement will be held unconstitutional by a majority consisting of this
group and Justices Brennan and Marshall, who find any death sentence unconstitutional.
The history of capital punishment in the Supreme Court provides a vivid illustration
of the conflict between the fundamental value of decisionmaking in accordance with
general standards and the equally fundamental value of individualized decisionmaking. In
1971 the Court rejected the claim that a death penalty statute was constitutionally
required to provide standards for the decision to impose the death penalty. McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 196-208 (1971). The eloquent dissent of Justice Brennan, id. at
248, became in 1972 the implicit holding of the Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972). In Furman, Justices Brennan and Marshall took the position that any death
penalty statute is unconstitutional. Id. at 304-05 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 358
(Marshall, J., concurring). The three other Justices in the majority invalidated the statutes
at hand because they authorized sentencing authorities to exercise standardles discretion.
Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id., at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313
(White, J., concurring).
In response to Furman, many states enacted new capital sentencing laws either speci-
fying criteria for mandatory death sentences or specifying criteria to guide the discretion
of sentencing authorities. See Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New
Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1690, 1691 & n.6, 1699-1712 (1974). The Court
has invalidated several of these statutes on the ground that they failed to provide for
sufficiently individualized decisionmaking. Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2965 (1978)
(plurality opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., an-
nouncing judgment of Court); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)
(opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., announcing judgment of court). Other new
statutes have been upheld as constitutional, partly because they allow consideration of
particularized mitigating factors. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271-74 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., announcing judgment of Court); Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242, 254-58 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., announcing
judgment of Court); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196-204 (1976) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ., announcing judgment of Court). It has been suggested that the
new statutes, prescribing criteria for sentencing that include consideration of individualized
factors, give decisionmakers the same unbridled discretion as they had under the pre-
Furman statutes. See Black, supra note 9, at 9-14.
50. See Turnbull, McKee & Galloway, Law School Admissions: A Descriptive Study, in
2 LAw SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, supra note 40, at 319-21 (summarizing use of non-
objective criteria at five schools). The departure from strict reliance on scores and grades
occurs largely after the high scorers have been accepted and the low scorers have been
rejected, so that subjective judgments are used only to override relatively small differences
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This general argument against the statistical method concedes that
the method may produce decisions that in the aggregate are correct
often enough to meet some requisite standard of accuracy. The argu-
ment denies, however, that aggregate results provide the sole measure
of the legitimacy of the method. The claim is that in some situations
the individual applicant is entitled to a decision that not only con-
tributes to a useful aggregate, but also reflects consideration of the
distinctive aspects of his individual case.
This concern for individualized decisionmaking is sometimes ex-
pressed in rhetoric that seems to protest all classification or categorical
judgments. Taken to that extreme, however, the argument seems to
reject clinical decisionmaking as well, because that technique too em-
ploys a form of categorical judgment. Although the clinician need not
identify in advance the characteristics he will regard as salient, he
must nevertheless evaluate the applicant on the basis of a finite number
of salient characteristics, and thus, like the statistical decisionmaker,
he treats the applicant as a member of a class defined by those char-
acteristics.r"
If the clinical method pays more attention to individuals, it does so
by giving each applicant the opportunity to call attention to his own
special characteristics. Even if special pleading seldom affects the deci-
sion, and even if it may slightly impair the accuracy of aggregate
decisionmaking, it may nevertheless enhance the perceived legitimacy
of the process.
A clinical decision process allows the applicant to present the evi-
dence and arguments he regards as most favorable, rather than restrict-
in scores. Small differences in scores tend to predict only small differences in performance,
and tend to do so with little accuracy. See Schrader, supra note 40, at 124, 130; Turnbull,
McKee & Galloway, supra, at 307. While there is no evidence that the use of clinical
judgment improves on the limited predictive power of tests in a restricted range, at
least the use of clinical judgment is unlikely to cause much loss of predictive power in
such circumstances.
School admissions officers sometimes depart from rpeliance on grades and test scores not
in an effort to improve the prediction of school performance, but in an effort to predict
later professional performance, or to achieve heterogeneity among students for the benefit
of the educational process, or for other reasons. See id. at 319-21. The effort to predict
professional performance has been singularly unsuccessful; this is at least in part because
of the difficulty in finding satisfactory definitions and measures of professional perfor-
mance. See H. PACKER, T. EIHRLICH & S. PEPPER, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 22
(1972) (Carnegie Commission on Higher Education); Boyer & Cramton, American Legal
Education: An Agenda for Research and Reform, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 270, 275 (1974).
The effort to achieve heterogeneity is described and approved in Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-20 (1978) (Powell, J., announcing judgment of Court) (opinion
necessary to disposition of challenge to minority admissions program).
51. For example, when a clinical decisionmaker selects a hard-working even-tempered
applicant as a good risk for a job, he is implicitly treating that person as a member of the
class of hard-working and even-tempered people.
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ing him to the items defined as relevant by a predetermined statistical
scoring scheme. The opportunity to participate actively in the decision
process is widely thought to enhance the participant's sense of legit-
imacy and fairness.52 Moreover, the decisionmaker who must confront
applicants as individuals is more likely to experience the disappoint-
ment of rejected applicants, and to agonize over the selection process. 3
By giving the applicant the opportunity to make a claim on the per-
sonal attention of the decisionmaker, a clinical decision process demon-
strates a certain respect for the personal dignity of each applicant.
Statistical methods not only lack this particular advantage, but they
pose an additional threat to the perceived legitimacy of the process. A
growing body of psychological literature suggests that the intuitive in-
dividualized judgments of most people are systematically inconsistent
with statistical judgments in several respects. The studies show that in
making individualized judgments people rely primarily on information
about the case at hand, paying relatively little attention to background
information about other cases.5 4 This gap between prevailing intui-
52. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUsTICE 2, 77, 95, 118
(1975); Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudica-
tion in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Cm.
L. REV. 28, 45 (1976) (difficult judgments best legitimated by fullest possible participation
in decisional process). This is a recurring theme in the literature about the functions of
hearings, and of the adversary system. See, e.g., G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF
LAw 120-35 (1978); F. JAMES 8& G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.1 (2d ed. 1977); Michel-
man, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in DUE PROCESS 127-28
(NOMOS XVIII J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977); Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of
Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 258, 279-80 (1978).
The opportunity for participation is not completely inconsistent with a statistical
decision rule: the applicant may be given an opportunity to challenge his score, or, more
rarely, to urge a change in the rule. Although such opportunities are conceivable, they
are unlikely to exist in practice. One of the chief advantages of a statistical rule is its
ease of administration. Therefore, a decisionmaker who chooses to use such a rule is un-
likely to accord individual applicants the opportunity to participate in the decision process
and thereby impede the administration of the rule.
53. See J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAw xi (1976) (decisionmaker's sense of
responsibility is "greater the more one is conscious that he or she-not some imagined
entity-is acting, and the more one is conscious that the action affects not a hypothetical
A but a real Helen Palsgraf").
54. For a review of the empirical results, see Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 ScI. 1124 (1974) (identifying and classifying some
ways in which intuitive judgment systematically differs from statistical inference). The
authors report, for example, that if people are asked to judge the probability that a given
case belongs to a certain class, they tend to pay little attention to the base rate or prior
probability of that class in the population, and to give controlling weight to any
resemblance between the given case and the typical class member.
For experiments supporting this and other generalizations about the divergence between
intuitive judgment and statistical inference, see, e.g., Chapman SL Chapman, Genesis of
Popular but Erroneous Psychodiagnostic Observations, 72 J. ABNORMAL PSYCH. 193 (1967);
Kahneman & Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCH. REV. 237 (1973); Kahne-
man & Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, 3 COONITIVE
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tions and statistical inference may explain a pervasive lack of con-
fidence in the legitimacy of statistical methods. A method that is pro-
foundly counterintuitive inspires suspicion and distrust, and detracts
from an applicant's sense that he has been evaluated by a legitimate
process.
The gap between intuitive individualized judgment and statistical
inference may in time be narrowed. As education in statistics becomes
more pervasive, statistical reasoning will become more familiar to all
decisionmakers, and perhaps it will exert an influence on individualized
decisionmaking. To the extent the gap persists, however, it leaves room
for questions of comparative accuracy and comparative legitimacy. It
might seem that the gap demonstrates the error of intuitive individu-
alized judgment as a general methodology. On the other hand, in-
dividualized judgment techniques have sometimes performed as ac-
curately as statistical techniques in the available studies. 5 And the
available studies of comparative accuracy have hardly exhausted the
field. Moreover, whatever the verdict on comparative accuracy, the
persistence of this gap may confer greater perceived legitimacy on the
clinical method. 56
Clinical and statistical methods differ not only in the extent to which
they pay attention to individuals, but also in a related respect that also
has important implications for the legitimacy of the process. A statistical
method makes explicit and visible the precise criteria by which ap-
plicants are selected or rejected, while a clinical method leaves the
decision process somewhat more obscure. The explicit statement of
criteria protects against the danger that a decisionmaker may rely on
illegal criteria, such as race. It also provides the opportunity for public
Pyscir. 430 (1972); Tversky & Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency
and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCH. 207 (1973); Tversky & Kahneman, Belief in the Law
of Small Numbers, 76 PSYCHOLOGICAL BuLL. 105 (1971).
In one experiment, subjects were asked to give the probability that the person described
in a brief character sketch was a lawyer. Each subject was told that the sketch had been
drawn from a population of 70 lawyers and 30 engineers. Some of the sketches described
people who fit the stereotype of a lawyer or engineer, some contained information un-
related to either stereotype, and one gave no information beyond the fact of the random
drawing. When the sketch fit one stereotype or the other, the subjects evaluated accord-
ing to stereotype, even if that entailed also guessing a high probability that the person
was an engineer. When the sketch fit neither stereotype, they thought the chance he was
a lawyer was 50%, ignoring the base rates in the population. Only when they had no
individualized information at all did they use the base rates and conclude that the chance
that he was a lawyer was 70%. Kahneman & Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction,
supra, at 241-43.
55. See pp. 1423-24 suPra.
56. Cf. Tribe, suPra note 10, at 1375-77 (counterintuitive statistical inferences should
not be used in evidence at trial because they may impair perceived legitimacy of trial).
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discourse about the desirability of the criteria that are used.57 Both
features of a statistical system tend to foster public confidence in the
legitimacy of the system.
The advantages of obscurity are somewhat less obvious. First, the
less explicit system is probably in practice more open to adjustment in
the face of new information about individuals or about the society in
which they live. In principle, a statistical system can be regularly
revised to take account of new information, but in practice frequent
revision is unlikely. One reason is that the decisionmaker who operates
the system and thereby acquires the new information is usually dif-
ferent from the person who formulates the rule. Another is that statis-
tical methods are often chosen for their low operating costs, and a
practice of frequent revision would undermine that advantage. A
second advantage of obscurity is that it avoids labeling certain char-
acteristics as predictors of failure. Because there is disagreement about
the goals to be served by the choice of predictors, the choice of any
particular predictors will inevitably provoke controversy. A decision-
making scheme that avoids the choice avoids that controversy.5s
A final aspect of obscurity can operate either as an advantage or a
disadvantage of the clinical method. When obscurity surrounds the
criteria for a particular type of decision, it encourages the development
of a specialized group of people entrusted with the power to decide. To
the extent that these people inspire general respect and confidence,
they enhance the perceived legitimacy of the system. Indeed public
confidence in their unarticulated judgment may surpass public con-
fidence in any explicit rule. But by the same token, to the extent there
is no such respected group of clinical judges, the clinical method will
be perceived as illegitimate.
Moreover, the connection between clinical methods and an en-
trenched group of clinical judges may have a more sinister effect as
well. The incumbent specialists often have a territorial interest in
preserving their discretionary powers, and the respect associated with
57. The requirement that important decisions be governed by explicit standards oc-
cupies a high place in the American legal tradition. For a masterful examination of the
sources and functions of that requirement, see McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 248-
312 (1971), discussed in note 49 supra (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Constitution
requires explicit standards for capital punishment.
58. For the advantages of obscurity, see Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 315-20 (1978) (Powell, J., announcing judgment of Court). In the view of Justice
Powell, whose vote controlled the disposition of the case, a school's effort to achieve a
heterogeneous student body justifies attention to the race of applicants among other
factors, but does not justify an explicit racial preference. This distinction, for Justice
Powell, is supported both by the Constitution and by the desirability of creating the ap-
pearance of fairness to individual applicants. Id. at 319 n.53.
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that discretion. Thus any such group, once established, may resist
efforts over time to make explicit their criteria for decision. On some
occasions, the established clinicians may yield to the promise of as-
sistance from an efficient statistical rule. The United States Parole
Board, for example, was initially reluctant to experiment with a statis-
tical method for predicting dangerous conduct. The Board feared that
a statistical method would cast doubt on the value of their efforts at
discretionary decisionmaking. Eventually the Board was persuaded
to allow the development of a statistical rule designed in part to
predict dangerous conduct, but designed primarily to predict the deci-
sions that the Board itself would make. The success of that effort
convinced the Board that the statistical rule codified its collective
wisdom rather than devaluing it, and the rule was adopted as the basis
of parole prediction in the federal system.50
But sometimes the clinical judges refuse to surrender their discre-
tionary power. Hospital authorities entrusted with the decision to dis-
charge involuntary mental patients have resisted the use of statistical
predictions, even though their decision closely resembles the prediction
made in the parole context. An involuntary mental patient is typically
hospitalized on the ground that he has a mental illness that renders
him dangerous to himself or others; he is entitled to release when those
conditions are no longer met.60 Hospital authorities purport to make
a discharge decision on the basis of a complex clinical evaluation of
the patient. Observers have found that among the important predictors
of a release decision are the availability of a job for the released patient,
and some suitable housing arrangements, but hospital authorities have
opposed efforts to make explicit use of such predictors.0 ' As a result,
the statistical prediction of violent behavior has been resisted in the
context of involuntary hospitalization while it has been embraced in
the context of parole.
One explanation may be that hospital psychiatrists, unlike parole
boards, do not specialize in the release decision. Instead they view it as
part of a broader process of providing service and treatment. They may
thus be more concerned with preserving the personal and individu-
59. Gottfredson, Hoffman, Sigler & Wilkins, Making Parole Policy Explicit, 21 CRIME
& DELINQUENCY 34, 37-41 (1975). The Parole Board was replaced by the United States
Parole Commission in 1976. Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 94-
233, § 2, 90 Stat. 219 (1976) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (1976)). This article
generally refers to the agency that administers the federal parole system as the Commis-
sion but occasionally uses the old name in reference to actions taken before 1976.
60. See Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Il1, 87 HARV. L.
REv. 1190, 1201-07, 1384-89 (1974).
61. See Weinstein, Real & Ideal Discharge Criteria, 1964 MENTAL HosPITALs 680.
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alized character of that whole process, and less interested in improving
the efficiency of the release decision, which constitutes only a segment
of that process. They seem to find it unacceptably restricting and de-
meaning to replace their clinical evaluations with a statistical device.
Whatever the reason for this resistance, it tends to obstruct one very
desirable path of progress. For in a field where knowledge is scarce, it
seems reasonable to begin with a decision process that depends on the
clinical judgment of wise people, and then move to a statistical rule
that codifies their collective wisdom and enables less skilled decision-
makers to apply the rule with uniformity and efficiency. But the
clinical judges who would provide the foundation for such a move may
often be its strongest opponents.
One way to describe the difference between clinical and statistical
methods is to say that clinical methods pay more attention to individual
applicants, and statistical methods pay more attention to the rules for
selecting them. Thus the tension between clinical and statistical meth-
ods mirrors in large part the familiar tension between discretion and
rules.(2 Clinical methods have the advantages of individualized discre-
tionary decisionmaking, while statistical methods have the advantages
of a system that depends on the uniform application of well-defined
rules. Thus, clinical methods protect most effectively against failure
to consider unanticipated individual differences, and statistical meth-
ods protect most effectively against the implicit use of illegal or other-
wise unacceptable criteria for decision. The choice of a method must
depend in part on which of these dangers seems most threatening. It
must also depend on the extent to which there is available a group of
clinical judges who command respect and confidence. A decisionmaker
using a statistical rule will be perceived as less legitimate than a highly
respected clinical decisionmaker, but more legitimate than a clinical
decisionmaker who commands less community respect. Because in
many circumstances these considerations will lead to the choice of a
statistical rule, it is necessary to consider in some detail the varieties of
statistical rules, and the grounds for choosing among them.
III. Criteria for Choosing Particular Predictive Items
The decision to engage in predictive decisionmaking through a
statistical method does not command the use of any particular statistical
62. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 15-21 (1969); R. DWORKIN, supra note 7,
at 31-39; H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127-29 (1961); Kennedy, Form and Substance
in Private Law Adiudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1688, 1699 (1976).
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prediction device. It remains to consider precisely what items to use as
predictors, and what weights to assign to each item.
To some extent, the choice of predictors can be guided by concern
for accuracy. If the device is meant to predict success, then the group
selected by the device should contain at least as many people who
actually succeed as would be found in a group selected by some other
means.0 3 But accuracy cannot be the sole criterion for choosing pre-
dictors. First, there may be no device that uniquely satisfies this
criterion; many alternatives may be equally accurate. 4 For that reason
alone, additional criteria are needed for choosing among possible items
and devices. Moreover, the values that inform the choice of one from
a group of equally accurate predictors or devices may be so important
that they require the choice of a predictive scheme that sacrifices some
degree of accuracy for other goals.
The choice of particular predictors reopens many of the issues that
accompany the decision to engage in prediction. The decision to predict
may tend to minimize the applicant's opportunity to control his pros-
pects for selection, and it may tend to reject the notion that selection
should reward meritorious behavior and punish fault. The choice of
particular predictive items may either reinforce those tendencies, or
restore to some extent the possibility of individual control and the role
of reward and punishment. Like the decision to predict, then, the
choice of predictors can raise questions concerning respect for the
autonomy of applicants.
Similarly the choice of particular predictors reopens issues that ac-
company the choice between statistical and clinical methods. The
decision to use a statistical method rejects flexibility and attention
to individual claims in favor of ease of administration and explicit
criteria for decision. The choice of particular predictive items may
either reinforce that decision, or restore some measure of flexibility
and individualized judgment. Like the decision to use a statistical
method, the choice of predictors can present the conflict between the
63. As noted in note 4 supra, the actual performance of a device depends not only on
its discriminating power but also on the distribution of success and failure in the popula-
tion. To satisfy criteria of accuracy in performance, then, it is necessary to choose a
device tailored to perform within specified limits on a population of known characteristics.
64. When several items with predictive power are themselves interdependent, their
collective predictive power can be arbitrarily allocated among them. One item can be
used to the exclusion of the others, or each item can be given a place in the predictive
device, without changing the accuracy of the device. This problem is called collinearity.
See F. M.OSTELLER & J. TuKEY', supra note 35, at 280-87; Farrar & Glauber, Multicollinearity
in Regression Analysis: The Problem Revisited, 49 REv. ECON. & STATIsTIcs 92 (1967);
Tukey & Wilk, Data Analysis and Statistics: Techniques and Approaches, in THE QUANTI-
TATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL PROBLEsS 377 (E. Tufte ed. 1970).
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uniform application of general rules, and the flexible application of
individualized judgment. This section will examine the issues that
arise in choosing particular statistical predictors and suggest the values
that should inform that choice.
A. Autonomy
1. Nonvolitional Predictors: Race and Others
Of all possible predictive items, race may have received the most
sustained scrutiny and censure. Both constitutional and statutory
authority impose stringent restrictions on the use of race as a ground
for predicting success or failure. The constitutional restriction lies
chiefly in the command of the Fourteenth Amendment that no state
shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." This provision controls decisionmaking by governmental
bodies, such as parole authorities, public employers, and public schools.
For such decisionmakers, the Constitution prohibits selection based on
race unless the justification is extremely strong.0 5 Private decision-
makers, while not governed by the constitutional requirement of equal
protection, are in many circumstances similarly restricted by statute;
legislatures have prohibited or sharply limited the use of race as a
criterion for selection by private employers, schools, lenders, and other
institutions. 6
Several reasons support the hostility in American law to the use of
race in selecting from a pool of applicants. First, there is the desire to
protect the accuracy of the decisionmaking process by purging it of any
unwarranted bias against a particular group. Historical experience sug-
gests that in the absence of a special prohibition, decisionmakers may
be influenced by negative views about minority racial groups to make
65. For a review of the doctrine that racial classifications require "strict scrutiny," see
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAgv. L. REv. 1 (1972);
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rv. 1065, 1081-1137 (1969).
The Court has upheld racial exclusion or preference on grounds of threat to national
security in wartime, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215-18 (1944) (exclusion of
Japanese from much of West Coast); threat to prison security, Lee v. Washington, 390
U.S. 333 (1968) (racial segregation of prisons) (dictum); need to remedy prior illegal racial
discrimination, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-25 (1971)
(race-conscious assignment of students to schools); and need to "prepare students to live
in a pluralistic scociety," id. at 16 (dictum). Cf. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-55
(1974) (special constitutional status of Indian tribes justifies employment preference for
Indians in Bureau of Indian Affairs).
66. E.g., Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1976) (lenders);
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976) (programs, including
schools, that receive federal funds); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, id. § 2000e-
2(a) (employers).
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negative predictions even when the predictive power of race is non-
existent.
Limitations on the use of race as a predictor also stem from goals in-
dependent of concerns for accuracy. The repeated use of negative pre-
dictions based on race has a cumulative effect. By repeatedly excluding
from various benefits the members of the same well-defined group, the
practice contributes to the formation of a discrete disadvantaged class,
whose members share a massive sense of injustice.6 A prohibition on
the use of such predictions can have both symbolic and real con-
sequences in reducing the separation and stigmatization of such a
group.68
While this second goal is distinct from a concern for accurate predic-
tion, it need not conflict with that concern. In some cases, the predic-
tive power of race is very small, and alternative predictors are avail-
able with at least as much predictive power. In such circumstances, a
prohibition on the use of race causes no loss of accuracy. Indeed, if the
predictive power of race is so small that it would ordinarily be disre-
garded, the decision to select on the basis of race suggests a bias on the
part of the decisionmaker that is inconsistent with the constitutional
and statutory concern for equal treatment. 9
When the predictive power of race is large, the attempt to avoid
racial criteria may create a greater conflict with the concern for ac-
curate prediction. Even then, it is usually possible to find alternative
predictors that are at least as powerful as race.70 In these circumstances
the alternative predictors will correlate strongly with race, and thus
have the effect of excluding disproportionately large numbers of one
racial group. A nonracial predictor that correlates highly with race
has some of the effects of selection based explicitly on race.71 For all
67. Moreover, the use of race as a criterion of selection is likely to induce behavior by
applicants that increases the apparent validity of race as a predictor. See A. SPENCE,
supra note 14, at 98.
68. See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 481-82 (1975); Fiss,
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 107, 157-68 (1976).
69. This idea is particularly well put by Professor Brest, who calls it "racially selective
indifference." Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Anti-
discrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1, 6-8, 14-15 (1976).
70. Compare Wolfgang's view that when race is used to predict criminal recidivism,
school achievement and other background variables add little predictive power, see Wolf-
gang, supra note 6, at 163, with the view of Peter Hoffman, principal architect of the
federal parole guidelines. Hoffman asserts that when criminal record and other back-
ground factors are used to predict criminal recidivism, race adds little predictive power.
See Project, supra note 38, at 877 n.329.
71. Indeed, under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976),
the use of a selection criterion that has a disproportionate exclusionary impact on a
protected group can amount to impermissible discrimination against that group. See Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAiW 65-184 (1976).
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its disadvantages, however, it avoids the extreme effects of a racial
predictor, which makes a symbolic statement about the inferiority of
one racial group.
A final reason for restricting selection based on race is that race is
beyond the power of anyone to change, and hence the use of predictions
based on race deprives individuals of the power to improve their
chances. The idea that each individual should have the opportunity to
seek his own destiny occupies a high place in the hierarchy of American
values.72 Although any decision to rely on predictive judgments poses
some threat to the autonomy of individuals, that threat is greatest
when the predictions are based on factors over which an individual
applicant has no control. The threat is reduced when the applicant has
the power to improve his predicted chances by changing his behavior.
The law does not consistently prohibit or restrict the use of factors
beyond the power of the individual to control; the law often permits
the use of age, physical strength, and verbal facility to predict success. 73
But it may be important that an individual is not bound to one age
forever, and strength and verbal facility may be influenced by effort.
It is extremely difficult, however, for a person to avoid the racial cate-
gory to which he is assigned by society, and partly for that reason the
use of race as a predictor is regarded with special skepticism by the
law.
Factors other than race, such as gender or illegitimate birth, are
similarly resistant to change by the applicant. Although the use of such
factors as predictors differs somewhat from the use of race in its history
and consequences, nevertheless some of the same concerns are im-
plicated. Of all the factors that might be used for predictive purposes,
those beyond the individual's control present the greatest threat to in-
dividual autonomy. Use of such factors in a statistical prediction device
is particularly undesirable if the device is to be used in a context in
which autonomy is highly valued.
74
72. E.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319 n.53 (1978) (Powell, J.,
announcing judgment of Court) ("Fairness in individual competition for opportunities,
especially those provided by the State, is a widely cherished American ethic."); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (footnote omitted)
("It is the student's judgment, not his parents', that is essential [to evaluate the Amish
community's restrictions on schooling] if we are to give full meaning to what we have said
about the Bill of Rights and the right of students to be masters of their own destiny.").
73. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (age,
strength); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (verbal facility).
74. In the context of decisions about incarceration, individual autonomy has tradi-
tionally commanded great respect. It assumes less importance in other contexts. The
success of an organ transplant, under present technology, can be predicted to some degree
from an analysis of the tissues of the potential donor and recipient. A person who seeks
1436
Vol. 88: 1408, 1979
Prediction
2. Predictors that Induce, Reward, and Punish
Predictive items that fall to some degree within the control of an
applicant include personal habits, such as drinking, and life choices,
such as years of formal education. The use of controllable factors to
predict success will tend to induce an applicant to behave in a way that
improves his predictive score. Indeed, this inducement effect is precise-
ly what makes it possible to use a prediction scheme while respecting
the individual's autonomous choice: the use of controllable factors
provides an opportunity for the individual who really wants to be
selected to choose conduct that improves his predictive score and hence
his prospects for selection.
But in some cases, the inducement of behavior may seem almost as
great a threat to autonomy as the use of factors beyond the individual's
control. That happens if the induced behavior falls in a zone in which
there is a strong social commitment to protecting an individual's private
and personal choices. For example, objections based on that commit-
ment may have contributed to defeat a parole board's use of marriage
to predict parole success,75 and the use by employers of pregnancy or
maternity to predict job failure.7 0
When the predictive factor is beyond the applicant's control, his
autonomy is denied in that he has no opportunity to influence his
to receive a transplant may be selected or rejected on the basis of a prediction of success
or failure, which in turn is based on biological factors wholly beyond the applicant's
control. Yet the disadvantages of selecting on the basis of uncontrollable factors seem
outweighed by the strong interest in avoiding the waste that would accompany erroneous
selection, by the relative accuracy of prediction, and by the absence of suitable alternative
criteria for selection.
75. The United States Parole Commission's Salient Factor Score originally gave a point
toward a prediction of success for a "[r]elease plan to live with spouse and/or children."
41 Fed. Reg. 22,344 (June 3, 1976) (Item I) (correcting omission in id. at 19,326 (May 12,
1976)). Subsequently, the Commission dropped that factor from the scoring scheme, and
over the course of the next two years provided several different explanations for the
change. First, the Commission stated that the factor was "sometimes difficult to score
reliably," and no loss in predictive power would result from revising the device (the revi-
sion also deleted educational achievement, and added weight to prior criminal history).
Id. at 52,890 (Dec. 2, 1976) (revision proposed). The Commission later stated that it was
deleting the factor of "plan to live with spouse" in part because that factor was likely to
be perceived as discriminatory, because it was a matter of social status over which the
prisoner had relatively little control. 42 Fed. Reg. 12,043 (Mar. 21, 1977) (revision adopted).
According to the Research Director of the Parole Commission, however, an important
disadvantage of the factor was that it was too easily controlled by the prisoner; the
Director stated that inmates were contriving living arrangements in order to earn a
favorable point. See Coffee, supra note 24, at 1027 n.159 (reporting interview with Dr.
Peter Hoffman). If the use of marital status or living arrangements is perceived as un-
fair, it seems likely that the unfairness lies not so much in the idea that change in marital
status is beyond the individual's control, but rather in the idea that such a change ought
not to be induced by governmental decisions about parole.
76. E.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
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chance of selection. When the predictor is within his control, he can
influence his chances, but his autonomy is impaired in a different way:
not with respect to the results of the selection process, but with respect
to the behavior that is used as a predictor.
Certain kinds of behavior are widely regarded as private, and for
that reason unsuitable as a target for inducements. For this reason,
some statutes prohibit private employers, lenders, and other institu-
tions from selecting applicants on the basis of marital status or other
related behavior.77 Public institutions may be restricted not only by
such statutes but also by the Constitution. For if the choice of marital
or other family relationships is a fundamental right,78 then selection
based on those factors may unconstitutionally deny liberty without
due process, and it may deny equal protection by impinging on a
fundamental right without adequate justification.
Respect for autonomy thus counsels not only against the use of un-
controllable factors, but also against the use of those controllable
factors that involve behavior generally regarded as private and pro-
tected against official interference. That leaves, as the most satisfactory
predictors, other factors that lie within the individual's control. Even
these pose some threat to autonomy, for their incorporation in a predic-
tion device will tend to induce behavior, and the inducement may
be so powerful that it leaves the individual effectively without choice.70
Yet the only possibilities are to use a predictor that denies people the
chance to change their scores, or to use a predictor that gives them the
chance but thereby influences their behavior. Given that choice, the
controllable factor-so long as it is nonprivate-is preferable because it
leaves more room for individual autonomy.
Considerations unrelated to autonomy may also offer guidance in
choosing from among these controllable, nonprivate factors. A good
reason to use a particular behavior as a predictor of success appears
77. See, e.g., Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1976); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 31-126 (Supp. 1978) (employment); N.Y. ExEC. LAW § 296(5)(a)(1) (McKinney Supp.
1978) (sale or rental of housing). For convenient tables listing state antidiscrimination laws
concerning credit, housing, and public accommodations, and displaying their coverage of
sex, marital status, and related factors, see B. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KATz 9& A. PRICE,
WVOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW 270-94 (1977).
78. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
79. A similar problem arises when Congress uses federal grants to induce state en-
forcement of federal policy. The inducement provided by a federal grant may be so
powerful that it leaves the states effectively without choice, and thereby intrudes exces-
sively on their autonomy. See EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); Stewart, Pyramids of
Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environ-
mental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1250-62 (1977).
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when society seeks to encourage or reward that behavior for reasons
apart from its predictive power.
For example, when a high school diploma is used to predict job
success, and the prediction leads to a decision to hire an applicant, that
decision can alternatively be viewed as a decision to reward the effort
that led to the diploma. When prior convictions are used to predict
parole failure, and that prediction leads to a decision to extend in-
carceration, the decision can alternatively be viewed as a decision to
impose additional punishment for the prior blameworthy acts. Recent
revisions of the federal parole scoring system have shown a clear
preference for predicting failure with predictors that can also be
viewed as blameworthy acts. Each time a controversial item has been
deleted from the list of predictors, it has been replaced by a factor that
gives additional weight to the fact of prior convictions."0 Perhaps the
most important reason for the change is that of all the factors that
predict parole failure, a record of prior convictions is the one that most
clearly represents blameworthy behavior.
The preference for blameworthy or meritorious predictors appears
also in the debates about suitable criteria for risk classification in in-
surance. In the field of automobile liability insurance, many insurers
use risk groups defined by gender, age, marital status, and place of
residence."' Increasing public opposition to the use of these categories
has led insurers, regulatory agencies, and legislatures to consider pro-
posals to substitute categories defined by an individual's voluntary
acts. 8 2 The reformers show a strong preference for predicting high risk
from blameworthy acts, and predicting low risk from meritorious acts,
such as participation in driver training.
The same issues arise in connection with insurance that requires a
prediction of life expectancy. Those who oppose the use of gender to
predict long life argue, inter alia, that unfavorable predictions should
be based instead on faulty behavior, such as heavy drinking or poor
80. See note 75 sufpra.
81. For a survey of history and current practice, see STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
THE ROLE OF RISK CLASSIFICATION IN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE 1-78 (Supp.
1976). See also MASSACHUSErrS COMM'R OF INSURANCE, OPINION, FINDINGS, AND DECISION ON
1978 AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE RATES 113-23 (1977); Shayer, Driver Classification in Auto-
mobile Insurance, in MASSACHUSETrS DIVISION OF INSURANCE, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE RISK
CLASSIFICATION: EQurY & ACCURACY 6-16 (1978).
82. See, e.g., Rights and Remedies of Insurance Policyholders, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 37-52 (1978) (Kenneth Hahn, Supervisor of Los Angeles
County) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; id. at 214-22 (J. Robert Hunter, Deputy Federal
Insurance Administrator, HUD); Shayer, supra note 81, at 4-6, 16-22; Stuart, Big Shift May
be Ahead in Auto Insurance Rates, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1978, at D1, col. 4.
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driving habits, and that favorable predictions should be based on
meritorious behavior such as preventive health care. 3
In predicting life expectancy it may seem difficult to follow the rule
of predicting favorable consequences from meritorious behavior and
unfavorable consequences from blameworthy behavior. For a short life
expectancy has unfavorable consequences in the form of higher pre-
miums with respect to some kinds of insurance, and favorable con-
sequences, in the form of lower premiums, with respect to other kinds.
In the context of death benefits, short life is a disadvantage leading to
higher rates. In the context of lifetime annuities, on the other hand,
short life is an advantage leading to lower rates.8 4 The solution is to
use different predictions for each kind of insurance. When short life is
a disadvantage, it can be predicted by blameworthy behavior like
alcohol abuse or bad driving habits. When short life is an advantage,
it can be predicted by meritorious or socially valued behavior like mili-
83. The legislatures and the courts have increasingly made it clear that sex-based
distinctions cannot be used in determining pension contributions or payments. See, e.g.,
City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Bernstein & Williams, Title VII and
the Problem of Sex Classifications in Pension Programs, 74 COLUm. L. REv. 1203, 1213
(1974) (arguing that Title VII requires employers to provide pension plans based on
unisex actuarial tables estimating longevity). There is evidence to suggest that predic-
tions based on blameworthy and meritorious factors may be at least as accurate as predic-
tions based on gender. See Waldron, Why Do Women Live Longer than Men? 10 Soc.
SCL & MED. 349, 353 (1976) (major causes of death related to "behaviors which are en-
couraged or accepted more in males: using guns, drinking alcohol, smoking, working at
hazardous jobs and being adventurous and acting unafraid"); cf. Haner, Prediction of
Automobile Claims by Psychological Methods-A Case Study in Automobile Insurance, 35
J. Ris & INs. 49 (1968) (attitudes and personality traits pervasive enough to provide work-
able base for insurance).
Prediction for insurance appears to differ from other predictive selection in important
respects. These depend, however, on a critical assumption that may often be false. The
assumption is that the result of an unfavorable prediction is to make insurance benefits
more costly, and not to exclude the applicant from benefits altogether. On that assump-
tion, the individual may be said to be harmed less by an unfavorable insurance rating
than by an unfavorable prediction of performance on parole, or in school, or in a job.
And the group that receives an unfavorable insurance prediction may be said to suffer
no net loss at all, because while all members of that group pay more for insurance, their
collective returns are also commensurately greater; indeed, the net difference between
premium paid and benefits received should be the same for a high-risk group as for a
low-risk group if the actuarial predictions are sound.
The flaw in this reasoning comes from the fact that an unfavorable prediction of risk
sometimes excludes people from insurance altogether. This can happen either because
the premium is beyond the financial means of the applicant or because the insurance
company elects not to sell insurance at all to selected high-risk groups. In either case, the
result is to disadvantage both the individual and the group by denying the benefit of
risk-spreading.
84. This fact can hardly be said to neutralize the vice of using gender to predict life
expectancy. First, not everyone buys both death benefits and lifetime annuities. Second,
even when both are available, they often use inconsistent gender differentials, so that the
cost imposed in one context is not compensated by a benefit in the other context.
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tary combat performance or employment as a coal miner. In neither
case is it necessary to predict short life from male gender.
When a favorable prediction is based on socially valued, meritorious
behavior, then there can be little objection to the fact that the predic-
tion scheme may induce applicants to perform the acts that improve
their scores. That inducement should be seen not as an unjustified in-
fringement of autonomy, but rather as an independent good, on the
theory that refraining from crime, or acquiring a high school educa-
tion, or obtaining good health care has some social value apart from its
power to predict success. Indeed, the independent value of the behavior
serves to respond to several other criticisms of the predictive scheme as
well. A system that uses praiseworthy behavior to predict success may
satisfy even those who object in principle to the whole enterprise of
predictive selection. They can ignore the predictive aspect of the
scheme and accept it as a system for punishing and rewarding behavior
according to its deserts, or for inducing desirable behavior and dis-
couraging undesirable behavior.
Moreover this alternative way of justifying the selection system also
decreases the importance of the possibility that a prediction system
based on voluntary behavior is likely to decline in accuracy over time.
This concern is one of the chief objections to the use of voluntary
behavior as a predictor. The fear is that when applicants adjust their
behavior to improve their scores, the behavior will lose its predictive
power. For example, if high school diplomas are found to predict job
success, and people are thereby induced to acquire diplomas, then
diplomas might cease to distinguish between success and failure on
certain jobs. That could happen if the education that leads to a diploma
does not contribute to success, but instead simply correlates with suc-
cess under present conditions.8 5 On that hypothesis, the attempt to use
education to predict job success would ultimately be unsuccessful.
85. The Educational Testing Service is greatly concerned about the possibility that
review courses can teach applicants how to improve their test scores, and that the result
might be to reduce the predictive power of the tests. Turnbull, McKee & Galloway, supra
note 50, at 318.
The United States Parole Commission has also been concerned with the problem of an
inducement effect that may weaken the power of a predictive factor. In the context of
high school diplomas, the Commission dealt with the problem by counting only a diploma
earned prior to conviction, and not a diploma earned subsequently in prison. An alternate
explanation of the practice was proffered by Peter Hoffman, the Parole Commission's
research director, who claimed that post-incarceration achievement did not correlate
significantly with parole success. Coffee, supra note 24, at 1019 n.125 (interview with P.
Hoffman, far. 22, 1978). Subsequently, the factor of pre-incarceration educational achieve-
ment was rejected as well, for the stated reason that the item was not highly correlated
with parole success, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,043 (Mar. 21, 1977); moreover, it might be perceived
as an unfair item of social status beyond the prisoner's control, id. at 12,044.
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Nevertheless, such a prediction scheme would induce many people to
obtain high school diplomas. If there is no independent value in the
behavior that leads to a diploma, then the investment in diploma-
gathering is pointless. If, on the other hand, education has some social
value or merit apart from its power to predict job success, then the
predictive effort that induces and rewards education has some redeem-
ing value even if its predictive accuracy ultimately fails.
Concern for autonomy, then, suggests a hierarchy of preference in
choosing predictors for use in a statistical prediction scheme. Non-
volitional status is the least desirable predictive item from this point
of view, because it denies the applicant any possibility of affecting the
result. Only slightly less objectionable is voluntary behavior that falls
within the zone of protected private decisionmaking, because it allows
the applicant to affect the result only if he submits to strong influences
on his autonomous choicemaking in the zone of private, personal be-
havior. Other kinds of voluntary behavior can be used as predictors
with much less threat to autonomy. The most satisfactory predictor of
all is voluntary behavior that deserves independently to be encouraged
or discouraged, both because that independent value justifies the in-
ducement effect of the predictive system, and because it helps to justify
the system in the event that its predicive power should decline.8 6
B. Uniformity and Neutrality
The choice of a statistical method rejects the flexibility and individu-
alized judgment of a clinical method in favor of general rules, explicit
criteria for decision, lower administrative costs, and aggregate accuracy.
Nevertheless, the selection of items and the construction of the device
permit considerable variation in these characteristics. The same con-
siderations that influence the choice of a method thus play an im-
portant role in the choice of particular predictive items.
1. Predictors Subject to Objective and Reliable Scoring
Under a statistical prediction method, decisions depend more on a
general rule than on the judgment of a decisionmaker. A preference
86. It can happen that socially preferred behavior predicts a bad result, and blame-
worthy behavior predicts a good result. For example, people who commit homicide are
in general good parole risks, whereas check forgers (whose crime is less serious, if not
exactly preferred) are worse parole risks. See, e.g., L. OHLIN, SELECTION FOR PAROLE 52
(1951). The United States Parole Commission uses this information as the basis for giving
negative credit for auto theft and check forgery. That item has provoked criticism on the
ground that it singles out for harsher treatment crimes that are not especially serious. See
42 Fed. Reg. 12,043 (Mar. 21, 1977). Perhaps one explanation for the failure of the
Parole Commission to refine its scoring scheme further by crime category is that it
would exacerbate this problem of appearing to reward fault and punish relative merit.
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for that feature may also dominate the choice of predictive items, and
lead to a preference for those that may be objectively and reliably
scored. When items are easy to score, then an applicant's score is un-
likely to depend on the person who does the scoring. Early parole scor-
ing schemes were severely criticized for using items whose scoring
required a large degree of subjective judgment, and therefore seemed
likely to produce results that would vary with the scorer.8 7 Similarly,
when the United States Parole Commission deleted from its scoring
scheme the applicant's plans to live with a spouse after release, the
reason given for the change was the difficulty in reliably ascertaining
those plans.88
Ease and objectivity of scoring are attractive partly because they
seem likely to increase the overall accuracy of the device. But in
principle subjective judgments could form the basis for a highly ac-
curate statistical scoring scheme. Indeed, despite the subjective and
potentially unreliable character of information about a prisoner's re-
lease plans, that item showed considerable predictive power in the
studies that led to the construction of the federal parole prediction
device. The difficulties of scoring that item failed to destroy its predic-
tive accuracy. Perhaps errors in scoring were too few to reduce the
accuracy of aggregate results. Or perhaps the errors in scoring were
systematic in some way that actually enhanced accuracy, so that parole
success correlated even better with recorded release plans than with
actual release plans. That might happen if, for example, prisoners who
tell persuasive lies about their release plans also have the skills needed
to succeed on parole.
The more important objection to subjectively scored factors, whether
or not the scores are reliably reproduced by various decisionmakers, is
the opportunity they provide for the decisionmaker to cloak his per-
sonal biases in the mantle of a scientific judgment. The presence of
subjectively scored factors makes it easier for a decisionmaker to ma-
nipulate an applicant's score in order to confirm a decision made on
grounds independent of the scoring system. Even if it happens too
seldom to damage the accuracy of the system as a whole, the possibility
of this kind of abuse may generate suspicion and mistrust on the part
of applicants. The use of such factors destroys one of the principal ad-
87. For one such scheme, see L. OHLIN, supra note 86, at 124-29 (evaluator required
to assign parole applicant to one of following categories: erring citizen, marginally
delinquent, socially inadequate, farmer, ne-'er-do-well, floater, socially maladjusted, drunk-
ard, drug addict, sex deviant). See F. SIMON, supra note 4, at 30-57, 145-48 (reviewing
scoring schemes).
88. See note 75 supra.
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vantages of statistical prediction over other methods: the apparent
neutrality of a fixed rule, uniformly applied.
In some circumstances, however, the arguments in favor of clinical
prediction are advanced to support the use of subjective scoring in a
statistical system. Deliberate use of some subjectively scored items might
serve as a hybrid technique that preserves a role for clinical judgment
and that gives some scope for recognition of individual differences. In
practice, statistical prediction devices are seldom adopted without some
such hybridization: either some subjectively scored items are incorpo-
rated into the statistical device, or the subjective judgment of the
decisionmaker is permitted to override the results of the objectively
scored statistical scheme.
2. Predictors Supported by a Plausible Causal Theory
Critics of statistical prediction schemes have been particularly vehe-
ment in their criticisms of factors that lack intuitive support in the
form of a plausible theory of causation. There is widespread agreement,
among both opponents and proponents of the statistical method, that
something more than mere statistical correlation should be required
as the basis for selecting applicants.8 9
The argument sometimes arises in response to the use of tests of
vocabulary and general knowledge to predict job and school perfor-
mance. Successful performance may be correlated with knowledge of
certain words and facts that have no obvious relevance to the demands
of the job or school. Test questions based on such knowledge have
been criticized on the ground that they measure knowledge that lacks
any plausible causal relationship to successful performance 0
A similar argument has sometimes been made in the controversy
over the use of gender to predict life expectancy for insurance pur-
89. See, e.g., F. MOSEaLER & J. TuaEY, supra note 35, at 270-71 (given several formulas
that will be about equally good at forecasting, decisionmaker should choose one that is
"reasonably presentable and defensible" and will avoid "hilarious newspaper columns
or ... the appearance of injustice").
90. One example is the test for the selection of police officers upheld in Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), reprinted as an appendix to the lower-court opinion, 512
F.2d 956, 967-76 (D.C. Cir. 1975); another is the test for the selection of firefighters, at
issue in Association Against Discrimination in Employment v. City of Bridgeport, 454 F.
Supp. 751, 756 (D. Conn. 1978), remanded, No. 78-7400 (2d Cir. Feb. 23, 1979).
Courts have long been plagued by the difficulty of evaluating a test whose claim to
usefulness rests on a statistical correlation, and not on a theoretical construct that renders
each test question a plausible measure of the quality being tested. Cf. United States v.
Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 953-55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1044 (1972) (Bazelon,
C.J., dissenting in part) (discussion of psychological tests in connection with insanity de-
fense to criminal responsibility); United States v. Schappel, 445 F.2d 716, 718 n.4 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (same).
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poses. Life expectancy is used to decide whether, and at what price, to
sell death benefits and lifetime annuities to applicants. If female gender
is used to predict long life, then lifetime annuities will be more ex-
pensive or unavailable to women, and death benefits will be more
expensive or unavailable to men. Other attributes could be used in-
stead, to partition the population into different groups with statistically
stable life expectancies. Among the possibilities are groups defined by
habits of work or nutrition, history of illness, or ancestors' ages at death.
It is a matter of actuarial indifference whether the cost of lifetime
benefits for the long-lived woman is borne by all other women, or by
people who share with her some other characteristics, such as similar
habits of work or nutrition. Similarly, the cost of death benefits for the
short-lived man can be borne either by all other men, or by people who
share with him some other characteristic. 91
One objection to the use of gender to predict life expectancy arises
because gender is a factor beyond the individual's control.9 2 A further
objection to the use of gender to predict life expectancy rests on the
claim that gender is not causally related to life expectancy. In fact,
available evidence does not answer the question whether biological sex
differences cause the observed difference between the sexes in average
length of life, or whether that difference is attributable to other factors
whose association with gender is fortuitous.93 Many people have
thought the answer to that question relevant to legal or policy decisions
about the use of gender to predict life expectancy. The argument seems
to be that if gender does not cause the difference, then its use as a
predictor is especially unfair, and that if it does cause the difference,
that fact tends somehow to justify its use.
Part of the difficulty with this argument is that the notion of causa-
tion is notoriously difficult to define with precision.94 Nevertheless,
91. See City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710 (1978) (footnotes omitted)
("To insure the flabby and the fit as though they were equivalent risks may be more
common than treating men and women alike; but nothing more than habit makes one
'subsidy' seem less fair than the other.")
92. See note 83 sukra.
93. See Waldron, supra note 83. The male mortality rate in the United States is
higher than the rate for females. Much of this sex differential can be attributed to
the incidence of artereosclerotic heart disease among males, and the incidence of this
disease is related to competitive, aggressive behavior, and cigarette smoking-characteristics
more common among men than among women in this culture. Id. at 349-50, 357. Other
factors contributing to the high rate of male mortality include suicide rate, fatal motor
vehicle accidents, cirrhosis of the liver, and respiratory diseases. Id. at 353.
94. The task of defining causal explanations, other kinds of explanations, and chance
occurrences has been an important and perplexing concern for philosophers of science.
See, e.g., C. HEMPEL, AsPEcTs OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 347-54 (1945) (statement of
causality may be viewed as working hypothesis); K. POPPER, THE LoGIc OF ScmirriF
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the demand for a plausible causal theory seems to have some identifi-
able features. In large part it is a demand for a story explaining how
and why the predictor leads to successful performance. And that story
should have support in evidence aside from the correlation at hand.
Lack of such a story is perhaps one of the more troubling features of
the claim of a correlation between knowledge of obscure facts and
successful performance as a police officer.
The preference for causal factors does not necessarily serve the goal
of accurate prediction. Observed correlations may lead to highly ac-
curate predictions without any causal theory, or even without any
explanatory theory at all. Moreover, correlations supported by a causal
theory may cease to provide accurate predictions under changed cir-
cumstances.
The importance of a causal theory is not that it guarantees the con-
tinuing effectiveness of the predictive scheme, but that it suggests the
circumstances under which the scheme will remain effective. A statis-
tical correlation in data about one group of people may not hold when
used as a basis for predictions about another group of people. A causal
theory helps to identify any relevant differences between the two
groups, or differences in the surrounding circumstances. Changes in
the job market could remove a previously valid connection between
lack of education and parole failure; changes in the typical employ-
ment patterns of men and women may remove the connection between
male gender and short life.
If a causal theory identifies such possibilities for change, it may ac-
complish more than warning the decisionmaker of the limitations of
the prediction device. For the theory, if publicized, may suggest to
applicants or decisionmakers a course of action that would change both
the prediction and the performance. For example, a statistical device
employed in setting rates for fire insurance may use the location of
buildings as a predictor of risk. 95 Under this scheme, buildings located
in cities receive lower scores than buildings located in suburbs, and
therefore coverage in urban areas is more expensive or even un-
available. The causal theory behind the prediction device might take
DISCOVERY 56-62 (1968) (discussing varied meanings attributed to "causal explanation").
Legal commentators have struggled to clarify the meaning of causal language in law.
See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 295 (1970); H.L.A. HART & A. HONORE,
CAUSATION IN THE LAW 1-7 (1959).
95. The practice of using location as a predictor of risk is sometimes called "redlining,"
especially when it entails the identification of inner-city areas as high risk, and the refusal
to insure property in those areas. For a survey of the extent of the practice and its con-
sequences, see Federal Insurance Administrator, U.S. Dep't of HUD, Insurance Crisis in
Urban America, reprinted in Hearings, supra note 82, at 223-351 app.
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any of several forms. The city might have an unusually high con-
centration of old buildings that are susceptible to fire damage, but for
new urban buildings the risks might be no greater than for new
suburban buildings. Or the greater risk of fire damage may arise be-
cause the city lacks adequate firefighting forces, or because the area is
home to several arsonists. Each of these theories has implications for
action that might reduce the risk of fire and render the prediction
false: the individual owner could choose to occupy a new building
rather than an old one; the city could improve fire protection or
prosecute its arsonists. Thus a causal theory may operate not to im-
prove prediction but to improve performance.
Another advantage of a causal theory is that it enhances the perceived
legitimacy of the predictive scheme. Part of the function of a selection
process is to reconcile unsuccessful applicants to their failure to obtain
parole, the job, the loan, or the other benefit at stake. In establishing
the legitimacy of a selection system, an appeal to scientific authority
may have contradictory effects: it suggests orderly decision rather than
arbitrariness, but it also suggests decision by experts who have un-
checked power to manipulate their system. A prediction based on
unexplained correlations requires the applicant simply to trust the
technical experts who designed the system. If the predictors are sup-
ported by a plausible causal theory, then the unsuccessful applicant
can have an intelligible explanation along with the invocation of
scientific authority.9 By using predictors that are both statistically
valid and intuitively plausible, the decisionmaker may be able to ap-
propriate the benefits of the appeal to science without the costs.
Conclusion
The choice of factors for use in a predictive scheme implicates values
that sometimes point in different directions. Respect for autonomy
counsels the choice of controllable factors, involving nonprivate be-
havior. Respect for uniformity and neutrality counsels the choice of
easily scored factors, and those that are supported by a plausible causal
theory. But a factor that is easy to score will often be beyond the
applicant's control, and one that is easily controlled will often be
difficult to score. Moreover, a plausible causal theory may be found on
either side of the conflict, or on neither. The choice of factors, then,
96. Decisionmakers as well as applicants may prefer a scheme that has intuitive
plausibility. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 39, at 56 (bank executive reluctant to adopt
credit-scoring scheme that would cause implementing personnel to "think we are crazy
and.., have a little less faith in the system").
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requires a choice between competing values in much the same way that
a choice between competing values was required to reach the decision
to predict, or the decision to use a statistical method of prediction.
The decisionmaker who would choose a prediction device for some
particular use must find a way to balance these competing values. He
must also decide how much weight to give to predictive accuracy. For
the conflict in values can be posed not only by factors with equal pre-
dictive power, but also by factors that are unequal in predictive power.
And in that case, it is not clear whether accuracy should triumph over
all other values. In order to make the choice, it is necessary to know
what is being allocated, what sort of behavior is being predicted, what
alternative selection techniques are available, and what advantages and
disadvantages inhere in the various techniques.
The advantages and disadvantages depend in large measure on one's
vision of applicants and decisionmakers. Statistical method and easily
scored factors are most appealing if wisdom is thought to be concen
trated in a few wise rulemakers, who can anticipate most important
contingencies, while the everyday decisionmakers are thought to have
inadequacies that require control by rule. Discretionary decisionmak-
ing is most appealing if wisdom is thought to reside in the people who
confront applicants and make decisions, rather than in the policy-
makers who make the rules.
If the nature of decisionmakers helps to resolve the conflict between
a system of rules and a system of discretion, it is the nature of ap-
plicants that is critical in deciding whether to predict at all, and
whether to prefer predictive factors that lie within the applicant's con-
trol. If applicants are regarded as fixed on a life course, then it is both
feasible and just to predict their future behavior, and to base the
prediction on factors beyond the individual's control. If, instead, ap-
plicants are regarded as able to change, and especially if certain
changes are desirable, then it is preferable to use nonpredictive criteria
of selection that tend to induce those changes by reward and punish-
ment, or to use predictive methods that base predictions on factors
within the individual's control.
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